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Abstract
Algorithmic graph theory has thoroughly analyzed how, given a network describing con-
straints between various nodes, groups can be formed among these so that the resulting con-
figuration optimizes a global metric. In contrast, for various social and economic networks,
groups are formed de facto by the choices of selfish players. A fundamental problem in this
setting is the existence and convergence to a self-enforcing configuration: assignment of players
into groups such that no subset of players have an incentive to move into another group than
theirs. Motivated by information sharing on social networks – and the difficult tradeoff between
its benefits and the associated privacy risk – we study the possible emergence of such stable
configurations in a general selfish group formation game.
Our paper defines a general class of cooperative coloring game that includes previous models
of coloring and social network analysis. While non trivial lower bounds were never established
for any of these particular cases, using a novel combinatorial technique we provide the exact
convergence time when up to two players collude. We also complete the analysis of polynomial
time convergence for cooperative coloring games in general, closing open problems from previous
works. We show in particular that when a general potential function argument fails to prove
polynomial convergence, then games always exist that either do not converge or take more than
a polynomial number of steps. Moreover, all our results are shown to be robust to variants of
the games, including overlaps between groups and more complex utility functions representing
multi-modal interactions. We finally prove that a small level of collusion, although it makes
convergence more difficult, has a significant and positive effect on the efficiency of the equilibrium
that is attained.
∗Columbia University & E´cole Normale Supe´rieure de Cachan, gducoffe@ens-cachan.fr
†Columbia University & Laboratoire d’Informatique Fondamentale Marseille, dorian.mazauric@lif.univ-mrs.fr
‡Columbia University, augustin@cs.columbia.edu
ar
X
iv
:1
21
2.
37
82
v4
  [
cs
.D
M
]  
12
 Fe
b 2
01
4
1 Introduction
Understanding how self-interested agents decide to form groups is a fundamental computational
problem which regained importance as multiple information sharing platforms are widely adopted.
In addition to form direct connections to each others, users of online social networks such as
Facebook or Google+ and microblogging platforms such as Twitter and Weibo are encouraged
to participate to groups in which information is exchanged. Participating to one of these online
groups comes with the benefit of receiving information that could be an advantage, as it was
previously well documented [15, 21, 8, 28, 9], but it also comes with the expectation to disclose
some personal information to its members. At times, sharing information with certain individuals
can be harmful [30, 1], and the increasing concern of users for privacy stresses the need to be
protected from such risk. In addition, one’s time and attention span being by nature limited, there
is only so many groups an individual can meaningfully participate to. This paper is about an
idealized but general model reproducing this tradeoff once summarized by the famous essayist:
“Nul plaisir n’a goust pour moi sans communication,
mais il vaut mieux encore estre seul qu’en compagnie ennuyeuse et inepte.”1
– Montaigne, in Essais III-9
In the simplest form of this model, a user may share information with others only by choosing to
belong to a single group. If users are represented as vertices of a graph, the results of their choices
is hence a partition, or a vertex coloring, of the underlying graph. The general model defined below,
which we call a coloring game, extends previous related work and lies at the frontier between the
behavioral analysis of social networks [26, 25, 12], the theory of coalition formation and hedonic
games [17, 6], and its more recent analysis through computational complexity [29, 11, 18].
A coloring game takes as input a fixed weighted graph whose edges denote potential connections,
and the weight on an edge indicates how advantageous this connection is to both nodes. It is positive
if this connection is desirable to them. An edge with a negative weight represents a ”conflict”, a
fortiori if the weight is infinitely large and we then call the nodes enemies. When a player picks
a color, she receives a utility determined by the weights of her adjacent edges, but only those
connecting her to players with the same color2. We also allow a subset of players to act collectively,
i.e., simultaneously changing their groups, to form a deviation. A subset of size k can form a
k-deviation if all players of the subset can simultaneously change their colors so that each of them
strictly increases her utility (see Figure 1).
The objective of this paper is to determine under which conditions a coloring game becomes
stable after a small number of steps, and reaches an efficient configuration. More precisely, for a
fixed value of k we call a partition k-stable if no deviation of size at most k exists3. When such
k-stable partition exists, we wish to determine whether the game always finds one after a number
of steps that grows at most polynomially in the number of players. We also aims at comparing
the total utility received by players to the best partition where this quantity is maximized, as well
as characterizing multiple variants of this game, including those where a user may join multiple
groups.
1“No pleasure keeps its savor unless I tell someone, but one’d rather be alone than in dull company.”
2Note that our game allows a player to choose a color no-one else is currently using, and receives zero utility.
3This is a k-strong Nash equilibrium of the game, called k-stable to align with [26].
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Figure 1: A coloring game. All solid edges
have weight 1 and all pairs of nodes not con-
nected by a solid edge are enemies (con-
nected with an edge of weight −∞). Labels
denote each node’s utility. (Left) A parti-
tion of the graph into 4 groups, nodes all re-
ceive utility 2. Note that the middle nodes,
which we may call the “connectors”, also
have friends in other groups. (Right) Con-
nectors can form a 4-deviation and join a
larger group, building a new partition where
each of them receives utility 3, while other
nodes’ utility decreases.
1.1 Related works and our contributions
Vertex coloring is a central optimization problem in Computer Science, with much of the work
centering on minimizing globally the number of colors used. Without a complexity classes collapse,
no polynomial time algorithm can approximate it. In a coloring game, a solution to that problem is
found through a selfish local search heuristic. Analyzing such games have proved in the last decade
especially fruitful for three reasons: (1) they improve and unify a series of well known polynomial
heuristics [29], (2) they naturally extend to design sound and efficient distributed algorithms [11]
and (3) they offer insights into how computational problems are solved in practice by human
subjects [25]. Games in the works aforementioned are equivalent to the uniform case that we
define and analyze first: In this case, all edges that do not denote enemies have the same weight.
These previous works consider the case where players move alone (i.e., forming only 1-deviation).
Our contribution: All these games are known to converge in polynomial time to a Nash
Equilibrium (i.e., a 1-stable partition) using a potential argument [29], but the exponent as the
number of players grows is not known to be tight. In fact, a non trivial lower bound was never
established. An entire new analysis allows us to provide the exact convergence time in closed form.
This result prove in particular that the convergence is always arbitrarily faster than the bound of
the potential function can predict (Section 3.1).
A renewed interest for coloring games recently emerged from a cooperative approach. Extending
game theory beyond the strict definition of a Nash Equilibrium, the analysis of cooperative games
studies how multiple players can form self-interested alliances. Cooperative coloring games involve
deviations of larger size (up to size k), and a stronger termination condition stipulates that no
deviation of size at most k is profitable to its members. The attained configuration of the game
can then show a considerable improvement4 but this comes at the price of a more complicated
local search heuristic, which makes it challenging in general to prove a polynomial convergence
time. All polynomial upper bounds to date rely on a potential argument which only applies when
k = 2 or k = 3 [26]. Prior to us, non trivial lower bounds were never established. Finding a
polynomial bound when k is fixed and larger than 3 is arguably the most important open problem
of cooperative coloring games. It has been shown to be impossible to establish using a potential
function [26, 18]. This again questions the power of the potential method in the first place.
4e.g., [18] established that for k =∞, the number of colors used when the game ends approximates the chromatic
number up to a logarithmic factor, but finding such a configuration is NP hard.
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Our contribution: Here, we solve this open problem as we prove that these games with
k = 4 necessitates more than a polynomial number of steps to terminate. This also completes the
characterization of a polynomial time convergence for cooperative coloring games in the uniform
case. It reaffirms the potential method as a “good” estimate of time complexity. The proof, which
closes an open problem from [26] and contradicts a previous conjecture from [18], uses a surprising
argument. The extreme pathologies that are responsible to delay the convergence are not derived as
before from properties of independent sets. They appear even in the simplest graph from a series of
bad “scheduling” decisions on subsets, which can be recursively nested to contradict any polynomial
bound. This result motivates a widely open problem: can a “smart scheduler” be designed in a
cooperative setting to avoid such pathological sequences, or is finding a 4-stable configuration a
PLS complete problem? (Section 3.2).
Moving away from the uniform case, we next analyze coloring games with general weights, in
which edges that do not denote enemies may have different values. These games present new
difficulties. Primarily, a k-stable partition is not guaranteed to exist (see Figure 2), showing that
the game may not always terminate. Prior to our work, no result exists that guarantees the
termination of the dynamics5. A Nash Equilibrium always exists, although finding one in general
is PLS complete for unrestricted weights. This motivates us to analyze the case where weights are
chosen in a fixed subset, for which the game converges to a Nash Equilibrium in polynomial time.
For the important case where all positive weights are equal, while null and negative weights may
take all possible values, we prove by another potential function argument that a 2-stable partition
is found in polynomial time. As a side note, this proof also yields sufficient conditions on the
structure of the graph that guarantees that stability of higher order can be attained. The key open
question is, again, is this result tight, or can games be shown to converge even when the potential
function method fails?
Our contribution: Our results close this question and also offer the first non trivial impos-
sibility results on general cooperative coloring games. Indeed, the potential function method is
“as good as it gets” for three complementary reasons: First, as soon as 3-deviations are allowed,
and even when positive weights are all equal, we provide a constructive argument proving that
not all games terminate. Second, for all other sets of possible weights that are neither trivial nor
trivially equivalent to the uniform case or this one, we show games exist that are not 2-stable.
Third, we prove that whenever the conditions for a potential argument are not satisfied, not only is
a game not guaranteed to converge, but deciding whether it does is NP-hard, even after the set of
weight has been preliminary fixed. Establishing this result requires us to build a general reduction
between convergence from any graph and a maximum independent set using only the fact that a
single counterexample exists. We found many of these results surprising, especially as in most of
those cases our proofs are based on 2-deviations that by definition do not diminish the total utility.
(Section 4).
Together our results prove that coloring games converge in polynomial time only when a poly-
nomial potential function exists. This has implications on the stability and efficiency of information
sharing and group formation in general, motivating us to see if this claim is robust to slight changes
of our assumptions.
Our contribution: We treat first the model from [26] that closely resembles ours except
that it introduces another specific “gossip” deviation (see footnote 5 above). While this model is
5The only result known [26] is a negative one for a variant of the game in which two nodes of different colors
can “gossip”, a deviation that results in connecting all other nodes in their respective groups into a single group,
without the latter being able to prevent it. We analyze first the case where such deviations are ignored, which is
more complex. Our results extends when gossip is allowed (Section 5).
4
u1
u2 u3
v3 v2
v1
2
2
2
enemy
3
4
4
3
3
4
positive
Edges Weights
u1
u2 u3
v3 v2
v1
2
2
2
3
4
4
3
3
4
Figure 2: A coloring games for which
no 2-stable partition exists. (Left) A
weighted coloring game: Solid green edges
have a positive weight with the indicated
value, dashed red edges denote enemies or,
equivalently, edges of weight −∞. (Right)
No partition is 2-stable: e.g., starting from
these groups, nodes v1 and v2 both decide
to move into the group containing u3, effec-
tively “rotating” the groups.
equivalent in the uniform case in which our results close previously open problems, we show that,
in the weighted case, gossip introduces additional pathologies even with a unique positive weight
and k = 2. Similarly, we prove that asymmetry in the assigned weights creates more instability: It
is then even NP-hard to decide if a Nash Equilibrium exists. (Section 5.1-5.2).
More interestingly, we extend our results to a “multi-channel” model in which users may par-
ticipate to more than one group, which allows us to study the formation of groups beyond the
partition case. This game resembles one in which Nash Equilibrium were empirically shown to
reflect the formation of overlapping communities in social networks [13]. We first show that the
proof of a polynomial potential function with general weights extend from a partition to the case
of overlapping groups. However, to our surprise, outside of this case, allowing group overlap can
jeopardize stability! Even when focusing on the uniform case, for which a k-stable partition always
exists, we show that not all graphs admit 3-stable configurations when nodes can belong to two
groups instead of a single one. (Section 5.3).
We then consider a model where the weights measuring the benefits and costs incurring by
nodes when sharing a group are not only defined on pairs, but more generally on subsets. We
extend the potential function argument of the weighted case to prove a sufficient condition on the
termination of the game that depends on the property of the associated hypergraph. (Section 5.4).
Finally, we investigate the efficiency of the equilibrium attained by the game as different size
of deviations are allowed. Previous works measured overall efficiency in terms of the number of
groups [18], or total utility produced [26]. We focus on the later as we wish to study the outcomes
of the games as experienced by the users, as opposed to minimizing colors used in a graph. Previous
results focused either the ratio of the best k-stable configuration to the optimal (i.e., price of k-
stability), while we wish to study the worst case of a final configuration of the game when it exists
(i.e., price of k-anarchy). It was only studied for large values of k, for which our results prove that
convergence can be uncertain or long.
Our contribution: Focusing on small values of k for which convergence is guaranteed, we
exhibit an interesting tension between stability and efficiency. The game using only 1-deviations
can be converging to a stable case far from the optimal. However, we prove that allowing slightly
larger deviations, while making convergence longer or more difficult, already significantly improves
the efficiency of the groups that are formed. This provides another example in which a stronger
form of stability is shown to positively impact the price of anarchy, as other recent works established
in different cases [3]. An important theoretical consequence is to motivate finding conditions on
graphs under which stability and efficiency can be reconciled. (Section 6).
Additional related work: Beyond works of immediate relevance for this model of coloring
games, coalitions formation have been studied in multiple settings including hedonic games where
5
agents form groups in order to enjoy each other’s company [17]. Indeed, a large number of coalition
formation models, including some for overlapping coalitions, have been proposed in cooperative
game theory where transfers are allowed between the players (see [17, 31, 10, 2]). In contrast
player’s utility in our model are non-transferable, which leads to a very different analysis. This
assumption resembles the cut and party affiliation games [4, 19, 14] except that in those, the
number of groups is fixed, and usually only Nash equilibria are considered.
Hedonic games where players cannot make side payments to each other usually model users’s
preferences as a partial ordering on configurations, and focus on finding Nash Equilibrium or a
configuration in the core (i.e., k-stable for k = 1 or k = ∞). This problem is already known to
be computationally more difficult, and the sufficient conditions for existence of a stable configu-
rations [6] as well as the previous NP-hardness reduction [5] cannot be used to characterize these
coloring games. Our results provide existence proofs and algorithm to cover k stable configurations
in a more specific case of users’ preferences, but it also shows that this particular case is sufficiently
rich to observe a sudden increase in the time and computation needed to converge, and that it is
surprisingly sensitive to the exact value of k.
2 Cooperative coloring games
The Social Network We model social group formation using an edge-weighted graph G =
(V,E,w), where V denotes the set of n users. The weight wuv captures the utility both u and v
receive when they choose the same color. Without loss of generality, we can suppose that G is a
simple graph (no loop exists, no multiple edges exist for a pair of nodes) and complete (since missing
edges can be added with a weight 0). We hence omit the set of edges E. Note that we assume
wuv = wvu (see section 5 for the non-symmetrical case) and that
6 wuv ∈ Z ∪ {−∞}. We will also
consider games for which the set of weights is constrained, we then denote it by W (e.g., Figure 1
is a graph for W = {−∞, 1}, Figure 2 is a graph for W = {−∞, 2, 3, 4} ). Note that if the edge
{u, v} is a conflict (wuv = −∞), the users are called enemies and will never choose the same color.
We denote by P = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) the partition with groups formed by users choosing the same
color. Note that some of these n groups may be empty. Two examples of such partitions are shown
in Figure 1. For a partition P , the utility for the user u is defined as fu(P ) =
∑
v∈X(u)\{u}wuv,
where X(u) denotes the sharing group in P which u belongs to. The global utility, or social welfare,
is f(P ) =
∑
u∈V fu(P ). Examples of utilities obtained are shown in Figure 1.
Dynamic of the game Each user in the network plays the game to maximize her individual
utility. Initially, all users choose a different color, forming a collection of singletons. Then we fix
a constant parameter k ≥ 1, and the coloring game starts. At each round i ≥ 0, we consider the
current partition Pi of the nodes. Given a coalition S with at most k players, we say that S is a
k-deviation, or k-set, when all the users in S have an incentive to join the same7 (possibly empty)
group in Pi, so that they all increase their individual utility in the process. When such a deviation
exists, we may allow any one8 of them to happen and, in so doing, we break Pi, and we get a new
partition Pi+1. Note that fu(Pi+1) > fu(Pi) for all u ∈ S, and there exists a group X of Pi+1 that
contains all nodes of S. Figure 1 presents an update following a 4-deviation. The game stops if
and only if there is no possible k-deviation. We call a partition P such that there is no k-deviation
that breaks P a k-stable partition. An algorithmic presentation of the game is given below.
6Occasionally, we include best friends denoted with a weight N such that N ≥ n× |wuv| for wuv /∈ {−∞, N}.
7As noted in [18], all deviations can be reduced to ones where everyone in the subset pick the same color.
8 Simultaneous parallel deviations can be handled with a loop avoiding rule [11] but we ignore them for simplicity.
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Dynamic of a cooperative coloring game
Input: A positive integer k ≥ 1, and a graph G = (V,w).
Output: A partition k-stable for G.
1: Set i = 0 and P0 to be the partition composed of n singletons groups.
2: while there exists a k-deviation for Pi do
3: Set i = i+ 1 and let Pi be the partition obtained after any k-deviation.
4: return Partition Pi.
3 The uniform case: Are longest deviation sequences polynomial?
A coloring game is said uniform if, except for conflict edges, all edges have the same unit weight
(i.e., W = {−∞, 1}). This game is entirely characterized by an unweighted and undirected conflict
graph G− = (V,E) that contains all the conflict edges (i.e., those with weight −∞). The comple-
mentary graph of G− represents all the pairs of friends (with unit weight). Note also that, for any
user u, the individual utility fu(P ) equals |X(u)| − 1, which is how many nodes are in the group
in addition to u. As shown in [18, 26] k-stable partitions always exist for any value of k. Let us
first mention why this game converges for any k ≥ 1. For a partition P and any i we define λi(P )
to be the number of groups of size i, and let Λ(P ) = (λn(P ), . . . , λ1(P )) be its partition vector.
One can see that a deviation of any size produces a partition vector that is strictly higher in the
lexicographical ordering. (for a more formal argument, see our Lemma 10 in the Appendix)
We can then define L(k, n) as the size of a longest sequence of k-deviations among all the
graphs with at most n nodes. One can prove (see Lemma 11 in the Appendix) that L(k, n) is
always attained in the graph containing no conflict edges, an instrumental observation for our next
proofs.
Prior to this work, no lower bound on L(k, n) was known, and the analysis was limited to
potential function that only applies when k = 1, 2, and 3 [18, 26]. The analysis of the game becomes
much more difficult as soon as 4-deviations are allowed. Table 1 summarizes our contributions:
k Prior to our work Our results
1 O(n2) [26] exact analysis, which implies L(k, n) ∼ 23n3/2 Theorem 1
2 O(n2) [26] exact analysis, which implies L(k, n) ∼ 23n3/2 Theorem 2
3 O(n3) [26] Ω(n2) Theorem 3
[18]
≥ 4 O(2n) [26] Ω(nΘ(ln(n))), O(exp(pi√2n/3)/n) Theorem 4
Table 1: Previous Bounds and results we obtained on L(k, n).
3.1 Exact analysis for k ≤ 2
In [26], the authors proved the global utility increases for each k-deviation when k ≤ 2. As that
potential function is also upper bounded by O(n2), the system converges to a 2-stable partition in
at most a quadratic time. We improve this result as we completely solve this case and give the exact
(non-asymptotic) value of L(k, n) when k ≤ 2. It also proves that this potential function method is
not tight. The gist of the proof is to re-interpret sequences of deviations in the Dominance Lattice.
This object has been widely used in theoretical physics and combinatorics to study systems in
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(a) P = P0 (e) P4 = P'(b) P1 (c) P2 (d) P3
Figure 3: An example of decomposition for a 1-deviation from group Xk to group Xj .
which the addition of one element (e.g., a grain of sand) creates consequences in cascade (e.g., the
reconfiguration of a sand pile) [20]. Let us define:
Definition 1 ([7]) An integer partition of n ≥ 1, is a decreasing sequence of integers Q = q1 ≥
q2 ≥ . . . ≥ qn ≥ 0 such that
∑n
i=1 qi = n.
Given any game with n nodes, there are as many partition vectors as there are integer partitions
of n. Thus in the sequel, we will make no difference between a partition vector and the integer
partition it represents. If we denote the number of integer partitions by pn, then we know the
system reaches a stable partition in at most pn = Θ((e
pi
√
2n
3 )/n) steps9. This is already far less
than 2n, which was shown to be the best upper bound that one can obtain for k ≥ 4 when using an
additive potential function [26]. For n ≥ 6 it can be seen that some partitions P of the nodes may
never be in the same sequence. It is hence important to deal with a partial ordering instead of a
total one. Brylawski proved in [7] that a dominance ordering creates a lattice on integer partitions,
where successors and predecessors can be defined by covering relation:
Definition 2 (dominance ordering) Given two integer partitions of n ≥ 1, denoted Q = q1 ≥ . . . ≥
qn and Q
′ = q′1 ≥ . . . ≥ q′n, we say that Q′ dominates Q if
∑i
j=1 q
′
j ≥
∑i
j=1 qj, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Definition 3 (covering) Given two integer partitions Q,Q′ of n ≥ 1, Q′ covers Q if and only if Q′
dominates Q and no other integer partition Q′′ satisfies Q′ dominates Q′′ and Q′′ dominates Q.
The main ingredient of our analysis is to exploit a strong relationship between this structure and
1-deviations in a game, that holds as long as no conflict edges exist (see details of the proof in
appendix).
Lemma 1 ([7]) Given Q,Q′, Q′ covers Q if and only if there are j, k such that: (i) q′j = qj + 1;
(ii) q′k = qk − 1; (iii) for all i /∈ {j, k}, we have q′i = qi; (iv) either k = j + 1 or qj = qk.
Corollary 1 Assuming no conflict edges exist (i.e., G− = (V,E) with E = ∅), let Q,Q′ be two
integer partitions of n. Then, Q′ dominates Q if and only if there exist two partitions P, P ′ of the
nodes such that Λ(P ′) = Q′, Λ(P ) = Q, and there is a valid sequence of 1-deviations from P to P ′.
In other words, any sequence of 1-deviations, from a partition P to another partition P ′, can
be decomposed into more elementary 1-deviations, satisfying that if there is such an elementary
deviation from the partition Pi to the partition Pi+1, then the integer partition Λ(Pi+1) covers
Λ(Pi). Note that, by doing so, we may get another final partition P
′′ 6= P ′ but it will have the
same partition vector, as seen on an example in Figure 3.
9The upper-bound directly follows from Lemma 10 (i.e., the lexicographical ordering argument).
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Theorem 1 Let m and r be the unique non negative integers such that n = m(m+1)2 + r, and
0 ≤ r ≤ m. We have L(1, n) = 2(m+13 )+mr. This implies that L(1, n) ∼ 23n√n as n gets large.
Interestingly, we prove that 2-deviations have a similar action on partition vectors, which im-
plies:
Theorem 2 L(2, n) = L(1, n).
3.2 Lower bounds for k > 2
Recall any sequence of 3-deviations uses at most O(n3) steps [26], by another application of the
potential function method. In fact, before our work nothing proved that L(3, n) is strictly larger
than L(2, n). We answer this question as we prove a quadratic lower bound when k = 3 using a
new technique. The method heavily relies on specific sequences of deviations that we call cascades
discussed below.
Theorem 3 L(3, n) = Ω(n2).
The above result proves for the first time that deviations of multiple players can delay con-
vergence and that the gap between k = 2 and k = 3 obtained from potential function is indeed
justified. Using a considerable refinement of the cascade technique, we are able to prove a much
more significant result: that 4-deviations are responsible for a sudden complexity increases, as we
now prove that no polynomial bounds exist for L(4, n).
Theorem 4 L(4, n) = Ω(nΘ(ln(n))).
The rest of this section is devoted to provide a brief sketch of the various steps used in the proof
for Theorem 4. The actual proof uses these claims with additional observations to build a rather
technical recursion on the largest sequence that occupies a large part of the appendix. As before,
we assume no conflict edge exists since we know this provides a bound on the longest sequence that
is attained. Our approach relies on a vector representation of partitions and deviations. Indeed,
recall any partition P is represented by a vector Λ = (λn, . . . , λi, . . . , λ1) where λi represents the
number of groups of size i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The initial partition contains n groups of size 1 and the
associated vector is (0, . . . , 0, n).
Given a deviation from a partition P to another partition P ′, we then define the vector rep-
resentation of this deviation as the difference Λ(P ′) − Λ(P ). In particular, as we only consider
4-deviations that consist in creating 1 group of size p, removing 4 groups of size p − 1, creating 4
groups of size p−2, and removing 1 group of size p−4, with p such that 5 ≤ p ≤ n/5, we can formal-
ize the vector representation δ[p] of such 4-deviations in the following way: δ[p] = Λ(P ′)−Λ(P ) =
(0, . . . , 0, 1,−4, 4, 0,−1, 0, . . . , 0).
We similarly formalize the 1-deviations that we will use in our proofs as follows. Recall
that a 1-deviation consists in creating 1 group of size p, removing 1 group of size p − 1, re-
moving 1 group of size q + 1, and creating 1 group of size q (if q > 0), for any p, q such
that p ≥ q + 2 ≥ 2 and p + q ≤ n. This yields either the vector representation α[p, q] =
(0, . . . , 0, 1,−1, 0, . . . , 0,−1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) or α[p, q] = (0, . . . , 0, 1,−2, 1, 0, . . . , 0). We also consider
1-deviations such that α[p] = (0, . . . , 0, 1,−1, 0, . . . , 0,−1) and such that α[2] = (0, . . . , 0, 1,−2).
We are now ready to present a sequence for the coloring game with a super-polynomial size.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the number of nodes is n = cL(L+ 1)/2. The values c
and L will be defined later and we assume for the moment that c is sufficiently large. We first do
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a sequence of 1-deviations to get the partition P 0 such that Λ0 = (0, . . . , 0, λL = c, . . . , λ1 = c) is
the vector of P 0. Using our notations, we observe that to get the partition P 0 we do the sequence
defined by (
∑L
j=2 α[j]) exactly c times. Thus, one can check that Λ
0 = (0, . . . , 0, n) + c
∑L
j=2 α[j].
In the sequel, we will denote any sequence of deviations by φ[l], where l denotes the greatest
index j such that φj 6= 0. Equivalently, l denotes the maximum size of a group having users involved
into the deviation φ[l]. Observe that given any sequence of deviations defined by a vector φ[l], the
vector φ[l − i], i > 0, represents the same sequence of deviations in which any 4-deviation δ[p] is
replaced by δ[p − i] and any 1-deviation involving groups of sizes p and q, now involves groups of
sizes p− i and q − i. Let t > 0 and T > 0 be such that 2T−1(2t2 + 2) ≤ L.
To go further with our vector approach, we need to check whether a given deviation is valid.
We actually remark that a deviation φ[l] is valid for the partition P if there is no negative value in
the vector Λ(P ) + φ[l]. This yields the notion of balanced sequence.
Definition 4 Given any integer h > 0, a sequence of deviations from a partition P is h-balanced
if, and only if, ζ = Λ′ − Λ is such that ζj ≥ −h for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, where Λ is the partition
vector of P and Λ′ is the partition vector of any intermeriady partition obtained once one or several
deviations in the sequence have been applied.
Intuitively, it suffices to have h users in every group of the initial partition so that a h-balanced
sequence of deviations from this partition is valid. In particular if a sequence of deviations from
P 0 to another partition P ′ is c-balanced, then this sequence is valid. In the following, we construct
a sequence of 1-deviations and 4-deviations and we will prove a sufficient value for c to get the
validity of this sequence, that is the sub-sequence from P 0 to any partition of the sequence, is
c-balanced.
Given a sequence of deviations, the size of its corresponding vector is the length of the minimum-
size sub-vector that contains all its non-zero values.
Definition 5 A vector has the symmetric property if, and only if, the minimum-size sub-vector
that contains all non-zero values is a symmetric vector.
Note that for a vector φ[L] with the symmetric property, L is enough in that case to deduce
the size of φ. Also, φ[L − i] defines the same sequence than φ[L] in which the sizes of the groups
involved in the deviations have been decreased by i.
Claim 1 Let φ[L] be any vector of size s with the symmetric property. For any positive integers r
and d, 1 + (r − 1)d ≤ s, φ′ = ∑r−1h=0 φ[L− hd] has the symmetric property.
In order to prove Theorem 4, we construct the sequences of deviations defined by ζi[L] for all
i = 1, . . . T . The initial vector ζ1[L] is defined according to Claim 6 which is rather complex and
hence we left in the appendix. To construct the vector ζi+1[L] from ζi[L], for all i = 1, . . . , T−1, we
follow a particular construction that is shown valid by Claim 2, and which is illustrated in Figure 4.
The construction is composed of a repetition of the sequence defined by ζi−1 a certain number of
times (linear in t) shifting the ”starting point” of each sequence by the same value (which Claim 2
allows to formalized). The construction then adds 1-deviations in order to get a special property,
called Good property, defined below.
In the following, we denote by si the size of the vector ζ
i[L]. We first define the notion of Good
Property.
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...
⇣1 ⇣3 ⇣4⇣2
⇣1 ⇣3
⇣1
⇣2
⇣1
⇣1
⇣1
⇣1
⇣1
⇣1
⇣2
⇣2
⇣2
⇣3
Figure 4: Long sequence using recursive cascades.
Definition 6 Given any integer i ≥ 1, ζi[L] has the Good Property if si is even, if ζi[L] has the
symmetric property, and if there exists t1i , t
2
i with 1 < t
1
i < t
2
i < 2t
1
i , t
2
i ≤ 2i+1, such that ζi[L]L = 1,
ζi[L]L−t1i = −1, ζi[L]L−t2i = −1, ζi[L]L−si/2+1 = 1, and ζi[L]j = 0 for other values of j.
Claim 2 One can define recursively (ζi[L])1≤i≤T such that ζ1[L] is defined as for Claim 6, and for
all i = 1, . . . , T − 1 there exists a sequence of 1-deviations ξi+1 such that ζi+1[L] = ∑aij=0 ζi[L −
jt1i ] + ξ
i+1, where ai is the largest even integer j such that L − jt1i − t2i > L − si/2 + 1, and ζi[L]
has the Good Property.
Claim 3 For all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ T , the sequence of deviations from P 0 to P i defined in Claim 2, is
(c1 + i− 1)-balanced where c1 is the constant defined in Claim 7.
Recall that t, T > 0 are such that 2T−1(2t2 + 2) ≤ L. The size s1 of ζ1[L] is 2t2 + 2 and
si ≤ si+1 ≤ 2si for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ T − 1. Also, recall that n = cL(L+ 1)/2. Consider T = log2(t) + 1
and, without loss of generality, assume 2(t3 + t) = L. By Claim 3, n = (c1 + T − 1)(2t3 + 2t)(2t3 +
2t + 1)/2 = (c1 + log2(t))(2t
3 + 2t)(2t3 + 2t + 1)/2 is sufficient to do the sequence ζT [L]. As c1 is
a constant, n = O(t6 log2(t)). For all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ T , let |Si| be the size of the sequence defined by
ζi[L].
Claim 4 For all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ T − 1, |Si+1| ≥ ( si2i+2 − 6)|Si|.
Claim 5 |ST | ≥ O(tlog2(t))|S1|.
As n = O(t6 log2(t)), Claim 5 proves Theorem 4.
4 The general case: Are games stable under deviations?
The uniform case we analyzed so far may be described as a “clique with enemies”: A pair of nodes
may either be connected by an edge with unit weight: wuv = 1, or they are in conflict: wuv = −∞.
More generally, a coloring game may be defined with weights taking values in a larger setW. Nodes
then choose to interact with each others according to more complex preferences and the individual
utility is not always related to the size of the sharing group. We first show the following.
Theorem 5 For any weighted graph, if only 1-deviations are allowed, a coloring game always
converges in O(wpn
2) steps, where wp denotes the largest positive weight, if any, and 0 otherwise.
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Theorem 5 proves that all these games admit a 1-stable partition, or equivalently, a Nash-
equilibrium. Note on the other hand that our dependency on the weights can be arbitrarily bad. It
is not that surprising, as the problem of computing a 1-stable partition is PLS-complete (a simple
reduction from cut games can be found, see [23]). So we will always work with a fixed set of
weights W. The proof of this result extends a potential function argument (see Lemma 12 in the
Appendix).
We now show how this analysis becomes more complex as k-stable partition (with k > 1) may
not necessarily exist. We look at the greatest values of k for which k-stability is always eventually
attained, for all games where weights are chosen in a fixed subset W. We denote this value k(W),
and establish it for various possible set of weights, which requires both to extend our previous
potential function argument proof as well as prove counter-example of stability with minimum
values of k. We finally strengthen the aforementioned results by proving that deciding if a graph
with weights in W admits a k-stable partition is either trivial (i.e., it is true for all such graphs)
or NP-complete.
4.1 Games with a unique positive weight
We first focus on the subsets of {−∞, 0, 1} ∪ −N, which contains in particular W = {−∞, 0, 1}
which is the simplest set of weights extending the uniform case to accommodate indifferent edges.
Whereas it does not differ that much from the set {−∞, 1} previously studied in the uniform case,
and which satisfies k({−∞, 1}) =∞, we show its stability properties are radically altered. Indeed
we prove that in that case that k(W) = 2 after exhibiting a surprising counterexample for k = 3.
Lemma 2 Every coloring game with weights in {−∞, 0, 1} ∪ −N converges to a 2-stable partition
in O(n2) steps. This upper-bound on convergence time is tight.
Lemma 3 There exists G = (V,w) with W = {−∞, 0, 1} such that there is no 3-stable partition.
Figure 5 presents a graph with 18 vertices, that is does not admit any stable partition for k = 3.
Note in particular the presence of 4 indifferent edges shown in dashed lines: Without these edges a
k-stable partition would exist for all values of k. The proof illustrates the complexity of sequence
of 3 deviations which are able to create infinite sequence of deviation at constant utility. To keep
the graph readable, we use conventions. (1) Some sets of nodes are grouped within a circle; an edge
from another node to that circle denotes an edge to all elements of this set. (2) All nodes that
are not connected by an edge on the Figure are enemies with weights −∞. (3) Green solid edges
represent edges with weight 1, whereas blue dashed edges represent edges with weight 0.
4.2 Game with general weights
While the two results we obtained (k(W) ≥ 1 in general, k(W) = 2 when W contains a single
positive weight) seem constrained, we now prove that these are the best results that one can
hope for. Table 6 summarizes the most important tight values for k(W). In particular we prove
k(W) =∞ if and only if we have one of the following cases: W = {−∞, b}, which is equivalent to
the uniform case; W has no negative (or no positive) elements, in which case the game is trivial;
and W ⊆ −N∪{N}, where N denotes best friends (see footnote 6 p.4) and stable groups are those
connected by N -edges.
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A1
A2
A3
A0 a0
a1
a2
a3
b0
b1
b2
b3
c0c1
Figure 5: Graph that does not admit
a 3-stable partition.
k(W) W
1 {−∞, a, b}, 0 < a < b
2 {−∞,−N, 0, 1}
∞ {−∞, b}, b > 0;
W ⊆ N ∪ {N};
W ⊆ −N ∪ {−∞};
W ⊆ −N ∪ {N};
Figure 6: Values of k(W) for different W.
4.3 Intractability with conflict graphs
Under general weights, we have proved that not all games in general have a k-stable partition, even
for relatively simple set of weights and small values of k. On the other hand, one could argue that
these results comes from pathological cases which could be ruled out after checking a property of
the graph. We prove that cannot be the case: not only is the stability not guaranteed for a given
game when k > k(W), but it is computationally prohibitive to decide it. We first define:
Definition 7 (k-Stable decision problem) Let k ≥ 1 and let W be the (constant) set of
weights. Given a graph G = (V,w), does there exist a k-stable partition?
Theorem 6 For k ≥ 1 and W containing −∞, either a k-stable partition always exists (i.e., k ≤
k(W)); or the k-Stable decision problem is NP-hard.
The previous result of NP-hardness in [26] requires another kind of deviations in addition to the
classical k-deviations we consider in our paper (see gossip deviations in Section 5). Moreover, the
large positive weight N is essential in their proof, whereas ours overrules these strong constraints.
5 Extensions of coloring games
All theoretical models of social dynamics should consider whether the overall behavior of the model
is not too limited by some simplifying assumptions. We prove this is not the case, as our results ex-
tend to account for various situations in the formation of social groups, including variants previously
discussed and new ones.
5.1 Gossiping
In this model, all k-deviations as previously defined are allowed, and in addition two nodes belonging
to two different groups may “gossip”, and in that case the two groups that they are part of are
merged. Obviously, and as before this deviation will only takes place if the two nodes benefit from
the merge, but what is unique here is that this deviation does not require that other nodes in these
groups benefits from the merge. They may see a decrease in utility, but they are not given a choice
to block the deviation, although they are in some sense seeing a modification of their group.
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This actually turns out to be equivalent to our model in the uniform case. One can easily check
that, in the uniform case, there is a valid 1-deviation whenever there exists a gossip-deviation.
Consequently all our results apply in that case, closing previously open problem with this model.
In the weighted case, a first negative result has been proved in [26]: when W = {−∞, 1, N}, it is
NP-hard to decide whether a given weighted graph admits a gossip-stable partition. This proof
hence requires multiple positive weights, including a weight that grows with the number of nodes.
We provide a stronger negative result:
Theorem 7 Deciding whether there exists a 2-stable, gossip-stable partition for a given graph G =
(V,w) is NP-hard, even with W = {−∞, 0, 1}.
Note that this proves that gossip makes this game strictly harder to decide: Gossip creates
instability even when a unique and fixed positive weight exists. Without gossip, in such case a
2-stable partition always exists.
5.2 Asymmetry
Studying directed graphs rather than undirected graphs is a natural generalization. In this case,
we may not have that wuv = wvu for all nodes u, v. However, even if modest generalization of
the model, asymmetrical weights lead to intractability. This can be seen with a simple digraph
D = ({u, v}, w) such that wuv > 0 whereas wvu < 0. Furthermore, the problem of deciding whether
there exists a 1-stable partition is NP-hard. This result holds even when an upper-bound for the
number of groups is known.
Theorem 8 For any k ≥ 1, deciding whether there exists a k-stable partition for a given digraph
D = (V,w) is NP-hard, even if the number of groups is upper-bounded by any constant g ≥ 2.
5.3 Multichannel model and overlapping groups
One assumption of our model is that nodes form a partition, hence they are limited to a single
channel to interact with their peers. In reality participants in social networks may engage in multiple
groups, although one can participate to only so many of them due to time. This motivates us to
extend partitions of the nodes P into multisets, that we call ’configurations’. We denote such a
configuration C, and it is said to use q channels if each user participates (at most) to q groups. As
a user can always form singleton groups, we can assume that |X(u)| = q for any u, where X(u)
now denotes the set of all groups in C that contain u. In other words C = (X1, X2, . . . , Xqn) with
possibly empty groups. Note that partitions of the nodes P are exactly configurations with a single
channel.
The utility of u depends on the number of groups that u shares with each peer:
fu(C) =
∑
v∈V
h (|X(u) ∩X(v)| , wuv) , (1)
where h(g, w) is a function that measures the utility of sharing g groups with a node with weight
w. Note that we assume, without loss of generality, that
h(0, .) = 0 , h(., 0) = 0 and ∀w ∈ Z , h(1, w) = w ,
∀g ∈ N , w 7→ h(g, w) is a non-decreasing function,
∀w ∈ Z , g 7→ w · h(g, w) is a non-decreasing function.
14
The last property simply ensures that h(g, w) increases with g when w is positive, and decreases
with g when w is negative. As an example: h(g, w) = s(g) ·w, for s a non-decreasing function that
initially takes values 0 and 1, always satisfies these properties. Especially, when s(g) = I{g>0}:
fu(C) =
∑
v∈V
I{X(u)∩X(v) 6=∅} · wuv . (2)
Using the same potential function as before, e.g., global utility, it follows that there always
exists a 1-stable configuration with q channels. It is now natural to wonder what is the behavior
of kq(W) when the number of channels q is higher than 1. While it may have none or positive
effects, we show that it is not always the case. Indeed, even for uniform games, Lemma 4 proves
k2({−∞, 1}) ≤ 2 with 2 channels while k1({−∞, 1}) = k({−∞, 1}) =∞ with single channel. The
idea is to emulate a weight wuv = 0 by forcing nodes u and v to be in a predetermined group.
Lemma 4 Let us fix h is as h(0, w) = 0, h(g+ 1, w) = (1 + εg)w, where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small.
There exists a graph G = (V,w) with W = {−∞, 1} such that any configuration with 2 channels
for G is not 3-stable.
In the case of general weights, a stability criterion depending on q has yet to be found. We prove
in Theorem 9 that any chaotic behavior may be observed between any two consecutive numbers of
channels.
Theorem 9 For any sequence of positive integers q1, q2, . . . , qp, and for any sequence 1 ≤ i1 <
i2 < . . . < il ≤ p, there exists a graph G = (V,w) such that there is a 2-stable configuration with qj
channels for G if, and only if, j 6= it, for every 1 ≤ t ≤ l.
5.4 Multi-modal relationship
Our model so far is heavily biased towards pairwise relationship, as the utility of a player depends on
the sum of her interaction with all other members of the groups. In reality, more subtle interaction
occur: one may be interested to interact with either friend u or v, but would not like to join a group
where both of them are present. Our analysis also generalizes to this case. We use a hypergraph
based model and we prove that, for instance, there always exists a 1-stable partition
6 Efficiency stability trade-off
Efficiency of configuration can be estimated through the sum of utility received by all the players.
On the positive side, we have a construction to show that, in our extended model with multichannel,
using more channels adds in general no particular difficulty to that computation.
Theorem 10 Assume h concave. Given a graph G = (V,w) with W ⊆ {−∞} ∪ N, one can
construct a graph G′ such that from a maximum partition of the nodes for G′, we deduce in linear
time a maximum configuration with q channels for G.
However, it has been proved in [26], that computing a maximum partition is NP-complete
even with uniform games. Hence, it does not only require coordination, but also has a prohibitive
computational cost. We first strengthen this result by showing that this optimum cannot even be
approximated within a sublinear multiplicative factor.
Lemma 5 For every 1 >  > 0, the problem of finding a maximum partition cannot be approxi-
mated within any n−1-ratio in polynomial time, unless P=NP.
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Note that in our extended model with multichannel, the total utility of the players can only
improve as the number of channels q gets larger, because more configurations are available. Unfor-
tunately, we also prove that computing the minimum number of channels that guarantee a given
threshold global utility is hard to approximate.
Theorem 11 Given U ≥ 1, computing q∗, the minimum q for which there exists a configuration C
satisfying f(C) ≥ U , cannot be approximated within n1−ε for any ε > 0 in polynomial time, unless
P=NP.
However, in spite of this complexity, we prove that collusion and multiple channels have in
general a beneficial effect on the price of anarchy, which is the ratio of the worst stable equilibrium
to this optimal. Nash Equilibria obtained by the dynamic of the system satisfy a general bound that
improves with q, in contrast with worst Nash Equilibria that are always arbitrarily bad. Finally, we
show that higher order stability, although it is significantly harder to obtain in general, potentially
improves this bound significantly.
6.1 Efficiency of Nash Equilibrium
Since we proved there is few hope we can compute efficient configurations in polynomial time, our
goal is now to study the efficiency of any stable configuration, and especially the ones that we can
compute by using our dynamic system (extended to many channels).
We start by studying the efficiency of the largest class of stable configurations: Nash Equilibria
(k = 1). Let us suppose q to be fixed in the context. For any graph G, we denote by C+ (resp. P+
when q = 1) a maximum configuration with q channels (resp. partition); the worst case C−k (resp.
P−k ) denotes a configuration with the minimum utility that is obtained in a k-stable configuration
using q channels (resp. partition). We first show in Lemma 6 that Nash Equilibria can be arbitrarily
bad:
Lemma 6 Assume here q equals 1. Let a, b > 0 be two integers. With W ⊇ {−∞, 0, b} or
W ⊇ {−a, b}, for any R ≥ 1, there are graphs G = (V,w) such that f(P+) ≥ R and f(P−1 ) = 0.
On the other hand, such situation is an oddity as precised in Lemma 7. We now denote by Cd−1
the worst equilibrium obtained under the dynamic of the system. Note that in the following, wp is
the maximum weight of W.
Lemma 7 Given integers q, n ≥ 1 and a set W such that W+ 6= ∅, for any graph G = (V,w) with
W, we have f(C+)/f(Cd−1 ) = O(h(q, wp)n).
The upper-bound above, if it were tight, would imply that increasing of the number of channels
might deteriorate the quality of the lowest computable Nash Equilibria. On the contrary, we prove
in Lemma 8 that the number of channels may have a positive impact for some sets of weights.
Lemma 8 Given integers q, n ≥ 1, and a set W =W+ ∪ {−∞} such that W+ 6= ∅, for any graph
G = (V,w) with W, we have f(C+)/f(Cd−1 ) = O((1 + 2n/q)h(q, wp)).
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6.2 Efficiency of higher order stability
Increasing k beyond 1 restricts further the set of stable configurations; they may even sometimes
cease to exist. However, before this happens, we can expect the worst case configurations, and
hence our general bounds, to improve. We prove in Theorem 12 that it is generally the case by
considering single channel case (the existence of a stable configuration is not guaranteed, but the
result holds if it exists). As we constrain ourselves to partitions of the nodes anew, we will denote
the configurations P instead of C in the sequel.
Theorem 12 GivenW, any graph G = (V,w) with weights inW satisfies, f(P+)/f(P−k ) = O(∆+)
for k ≥ 2, where ∆+ = maxv∈V | { u | wuv > 0 } |.
Note the result also holds for k = 1 whenever neither {−∞, 0, b} ⊆ W nor {−a, b} ⊆ W. Indeed,
in this case, if there exist u, v such that fu(P ) = fv(P ) = 0, whereas wuv > 0, then u can reach the
group of v, or vice-versa, and so, there is a 1-deviation.
In other words, we show that for k ≥ 2 stable partitions are with a multiplicative factor of the
optimal given by the maximum degree of a node in the friendship graph.
We define the price of k-anarchy pa(n, k) as the greatest ratio f(P
+)/f(P−k ) obtained for a
graph G with n nodes. By considering a worst case degree, we have pa(n, k) = O(n). For a given k,
this bound is tight: we can even construct a graph with W ⊆ N and any other non trivial weights
such that f(P+)/f(P−k ) = Ω(n).
Lemma 9 Let k be any integer k ≥ 2. Given positive integers b, b′ such that b′ < b, and a non-
negative integer a, there is a graph G = (V,w):
- with W ⊃ {−a, b}, such that f(P+)
f(P−k )
≥ (k+1)b
n
(k+1)2
c−1
k .
- with W ⊃ {b, b′}, such that f(P+)
f(P−k )
≥ 1 + b′b
kb(b n
kb
c−1)
kb−1 .
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix 1: proofs of Section 3
Lemma 10 For any k ≥ 1, for any conflict graph G−, the system converges to a k-stable partition.
Proof. [Lemma 10] Let Pi, Pi+1 be two partitions for G
− such that Pi+1 is obtained from Pi after
a k-deviation for Pi. We prove Λ(Pi) <L Λ(Pi+1) where <L is the lexicographical ordering. By
definition, for any u ∈ S, we have fu(Pi) < fu(Pi+1), where S represents the set of nodes involving
in the k-deviation (|S| ≤ k). Thus, we get Λ(Pi+1) − Λ(Pi) = (0, . . . , 0, 1, . . .), and so Λ(Pi) <L
Λ(Pi+1). Finally, as the number of possible vectors is finite, we obtain the convergence of the
system. 
Lemma 11 For any k, n ≥ 1, there is a sequence of k-deviations with size L(k, n) in G∅, where
G∅ = (V,E) is the conflict graph such that |V | = n and |E| = 0.
Proof. [Lemma 11] In order to prove the lemma, let k, n ≥ 1, and let G− = (V,E) be any graph
with |V | = n. We consider a longest sequence of k-deviations for G−. Then, we can mimic this
sequence for G− in order to get a valid sub-sequence for G∅. Indeed, every k-deviation for G− is a
valid k-deviation for G∅. We get there is a sequence of k-deviations for G∅ that is at least as long
as a longest sequence of k-deviations for G−. Because there is a finite number of conflict graphs
with n nodes, this clearly implies that there exists a sequence of k-deviations with maximum size
for G∅. 
Proof. [Corollary 1] First, assume Q′ covers Q. By Lemma 1, there exist j, k such that q′j = qj + 1,
q′k = qk − 1, and for all i such that i 6= j, k, q′i = qi. Moreover, since k = j + 1 or qj = qk, we get
qj ≥ qk. Let P be any partition of the nodes such that Λ(P ) = Q. We can write P = (X1, . . . , Xn)
such that |Xi| = qi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let v be any vertex in Xk. Such a vertex exists because
|Xk| = qk > 0. Then v can move from Xk to Xj , and it is a valid 1-deviation because |Xj | = qj ≥ qk.
In so doing, we get a new partition P ′ = (X ′1, . . . , X ′n) for the nodes such that |X ′j | = |Xj | + 1,
|X ′k| = |Xk| − 1, and for all i such that i 6= j, k, |X ′i| = |Xi|. In other words, Λ(P ′) = Q′.
More generally, if Q′ dominates Q then there exists a sequence Q = Q1, Q2, . . . , Qp = Q′, such
that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ p− 1, Qi+1 covers Qi. Therefore, we can iterate the process, and we get the
expected result.
Conversely, let P = (X1, . . . , Xn), be a partition for the nodes, let S = {v} be any 1-deviation
that breaks P , and let P ′ = (X ′1, . . . , X ′n) be the resulting partition for the nodes. Then v leaves
some group Xk for another group Xj . Furthermore, |Xj | ≥ |Xk| by the hypothesis. So, we get
either |Xj | = |Xk|, or |Xj | > |Xk|, hence j ≤ k − 1. Let us denote Q = Λ(P ) and Q′ = Λ(P ′). By
a reordering of groups with equal size, we may assume that Xj is the first group with size |Xj |,
whereas Xk is the last group with size |Xk| in P . Then:
• if i ∈ {1, . . . , j − 1}, then ∑il=1 |X ′l | = ∑il=1 |Xl|;
• if i ∈ {j, . . . , k − 1}, then ∑il=1 |X ′l | = [∑il=1 |Xl|] + 1;
• if i ∈ {k, . . . , n}, then ∑il=1 |X ′l | = ∑il=1 |Xl|.
As a consequence, we have that Q′ dominates Q by the hypothesis. 
Proof. [Theorem 1] We first recall that a chain of integer partitions is a sequence of integer partitions
Q1, . . . , Qp such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ p − 1, Qi+1 dominates Qi. Especially, a covering chain is a
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chain such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ p − 1, Qi+1 covers Qi. It has been proven in [22] the maximum
length of such a chain in the Dominance Lattice is exactly 2
(
m+1
3
)
+ mr. Moreover, it should be
clear that any chain with maximum length is a covering chain.
Note that to any sequence of partitions of the nodes P1, P2, . . . , Pp that is obtained via 1-
deviations, we can associate a chain of integer partitions with the same length p, by Corollary 1.
Hence L(1, n) is upper-bounded by the size of a longest chain of integer partitions. Conversely,
any covering chain of integer partitions Q1, Q2, . . . , Qp can be associated to such a sequence of
partitions of the nodes. As a consequence, that maximum length is also a lower-bound.
We get L(1, n) = 2
(
m+1
3
)
+mr 
Proof. [Theorem 2] Clearly, L(2, n) =≥ L(1, n).
Let G∅ = (V,E) be the conflict graph such that |V | = n and |E| = 0. Let P be any partition of
the nodes for G∅ such that there exists S = {u, v} that breaks P . We denote by X ′ the group in
P both vertices in S agree to join together. If |X ′| ≥ |X(u)| or |X ′| ≥ |X(v)|, then the 2-deviation
can be decomposed into 1-deviations. So, we suppose that |X ′| = |X(u)| − 1 = |X(v)| − 1. There
are two cases:
a) SupposeX(u) = X(v). Then, after the 2-deviation, we replaceX(u), X ′, byX(u)\{u, v}, X ′∪
{u, v}; that is we get two groups of size |X(u)| − 2, |X(u)|+ 1, respectively, instead of two groups
of size |X(u)| − 1, |X(u)|, respectively. Thus, if a vertex of X ′ breaks P by joining group X(u) we
get the same partition vector.
b) Now suppose X(u) 6= X(v). Then, after the 2-deviation, we replace X(u), X(v), X ′, by
X(u) \ {u}, X(v) \ {v}, X ′ ∪ {u, v}; that is we get three groups of size |X(u)| − 1, |X(u)| − 1,
|X(u)| + 1 , respectively, instead of three groups of size |X(u)| − 1, |X(u)|, |X(u)|, respectively.
Thus, if a vertex of X(v) breaks P and joins group X(u), then we also get the same partition
vector.
Finally, any partition vector that is gotten from a 2-deviation may also be gotten from a sequence
of 1-deviations. Consequently, L(2, n) = L(1, n) = θ(n
√
n). 
Proof. [Theorem 3] Let us consider the conflict graph G∅ = (V,E) such that |V | = n and |E| = 0.
Recall that any partition P is represented by Λ = (λn, . . . , λi, . . . , λ1) where λi represents the
number of groups of size i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We here only consider 3-deviations that consist in creating
1 group of size p, removing 3 groups of size p− 1, creating 3 groups of size p− 2, and removing 1
group of size p−3, for some p such that 4 ≤ p ≤ n/4. In other words, we focus on 3-deviations from
P to P ′ such that Λ′ − Λ = (. . . , 0, 1,−3, 3,−1, 0, . . .) where Λ and Λ′ are the vectors of partitions
P and P ′, respectively. For any p, 4 ≤ p ≤ n/4, we define the vector γ[p] of size n such that:
γ[p]j = 0 j = p+ 1, . . . n
γ[p]p = 1
γ[p]p−1 = −3
γ[p]p−2 = 3
γ[p]p−3 = −1
γ[p]j = 0 j = 1, . . . p− 4.
Given the vector Λ of a partition P , the 3-deviation considered here is such that Λ′ = Λ + γ[p],
for some p, 4 ≤ p ≤ n/4, where Λ′ represents the new partition after the deviation.
The number of nodes is assumed to be n = O(cL2), where c denotes a large constant integer. We
first do a sequence of 1-deviations to get the partition P such that Λ = (0, . . . , 0, λL = c, . . . , λ1 = c)
represents the vector of P .
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Let t = L−14 .
We do t+ 1 consecutive 3-deviations γ[L], . . . , γ[L− t] starting from P . We get Λ1 = Λ + γ1[L]
where Λ1 is the vector of the resulting partition P 1 and γ1[L] =
∑L
i=L−t γ[i] is such that:
γ1[L]j = 0 j = L+ 1, . . . , n
γ1[L]L = 1
γ1[L]L−1 = −2
γ1[L]L−2 = 1
γ1[L]j = 0 j = L− t, . . . , L− 3
γ1[L]L−t−1 = −1
γ1[L]L−t−2 = 2
γ1[L]L−t−3 = −1
γ1[L]j = 0 j = 1, . . . , L− t− 4.
We repeat the sequence defined by γ1 starting from L−1, L−2, . . . , L− t+2. That corresponds
to t − 1 consecutive sequences γ1[L], . . . , γ1[L − t + 2] starting from P . We get Λ2 = Λ + γ2[L]
where Λ2 is the vector of the resulting partition P 2 and γ2[L] =
∑L
i=L−t+2 γ
1[i] is such that:
γ2[L]j = 0 j = L+ 1, . . . , n
γ2[L]L = 1
γ2[L]L−1 = −1
γ2[L]j = 0 j = L− t+ 2, . . . , L− 2
γ2[L]L−t+1 = −1
γ2[L]L−t = 1
γ2[L]L−t−1 = −1
γ2[L]L−t−2 = 1
γ2[L]j = 0 j = L− 2t+ 1, . . . , L− t− 3
γ2[L]L−2t = 1
γ2[L]L−2t−1 = −1
γ2[L]j = 0 j = 1, . . . , L− 2t− 2.
We repeat the sequence γ2 starting from L− 1, L− 2, . . . , L− t+ 4. That corresponds to t− 3
consecutive sequences γ2[L], . . . , γ2[L− t+ 4] starting from P . We get Λ3 = Λ + γ3[L] where Λ3 is
the vector of the resulting partition P 3 and γ3[L] =
∑L
i=L−t+4 γ
2[i] is such that:
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
γ3[L]j = 0 j = L+ 1, . . . , n
γ3[L]L = 1
γ3[L]j = 0 j = L− t+ 4, . . . , L− 1
γ3[L]L−t+3 = −1
γ3[L]L−t+2 = −1
γ3[L]L−t+1 = 0
γ3[L]L−t = −1
γ3[L]j = 0 j = L− 3t+ 4, . . . , L− t− 1
γ3[L]L−3t+3 = 1
γ3[L]L−3t+2 = 0
γ3[L]L−3t+1 = 1
γ3[L]j = 0 j = L− 4t+ 1, . . . , L− 3t
γ3[L]L−4t = −1
γ3[L]j = 0 j = 1, . . . , L− 4t− 1.
We finally repeat the sequence γ3 from L − 1, L − 2, . . . , L − t + 1. That corresponds to t
consecutive sequences γ3[L], . . . , γ3[L− t+ 1] starting from P . We get Λ4 = Λ + γ4[L] where Λ4 is
the vector of the resulting partition P 4 and γ4[L] =
∑L
i=L−t+1 γ
3[i]. Note as γ3[i] has a constant
number of non zero values, then γ4j [L] ≥ −c for any j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, where c ≥ 4. So, the sequence is
indeed valid when we start from P , which means we have enough groups of each size to do it.
Set t = θ(L) such that t ≤ L−14 . We get that the total number of 3-deviations is θ(t4) = θ(L4).
Recall that the number of nodes is θ(cL2) = θ(L2). Thus L(3, n) = Ω(n2). 
Proof of super-polynomial lower bound for k ≥ 4 (Thm 4). We first formalize the de-
viations we will use in the proof. We only consider 4-deviations that consist in creating 1 group
of size p, removing 4 groups of size p − 1, creating 4 groups of size p − 2, and removing 1 group
of size p − 4, with p such that 5 ≤ p ≤ n/5. For all p, 5 ≤ p ≤ n/5, we define the vector δ[p]
of size n such that for all j = 1, . . . , n, δ[p]p = 1, δ[p]p−1 = −4 δ[p]p−2 = 4 δ[p]p−4 = −1, and
δ[p]j = 0 otherwise. Given the vector Λ of a partition P , the 4-deviation considered here is such
that Λ′ = Λ + δ[p], for some p, 5 ≤ p ≤ n/5, where Λ′ represents the vector of the new partition
after the 4-deviation defined by δ[p] = Λ′ − Λ = (0, . . . , 0, 1,−4, 4, 0,−1, 0, . . . , 0). In other words,
we focus on 4-deviations from P to P ′ such that Λ′ − Λ = (0, . . . , 0, 1,−4, 4, 0,−1, 0, . . . , 0).
We now formalize the 1-deviations as follows. Recall that a 1-deviation consists in creating 1
group of size p, removing 1 group of size p− 1, removing 1 group of size q+ 1, and creating 1 group
of size q (if q > 0), for any p, q such that p ≥ q+ 2 ≥ 2 and p+ q ≤ n. Hence for any p, q such that
p > q + 2 ≥ 3 and p + q ≤ n, we define the vector α[p, q] of size n such that for all j = 1, . . . n,
α[p, q]p = 1, α[p, q]p−1 = −1, α[p, q]q+1 = −1 α[p, q]q = 1, and α[p, q]j = 0 otherwise. For any p, q
such that p = q + 2 ≥ 3 and p + q ≤ n, we define the vector α[p, q] = α[p, p − 2] of size n such
that for all j = 1, . . . , n, α[p, q]p = 1, α[p, q]p−1 = −2, α[p, q]p−2=q = 1, and α[p, q]j = 0 otherwise.
Given the vector Λ of a partition P , the 1-deviation considered above is such that Λ′ = Λ +α[p, q],
for some p, q such that p ≥ q + 2 ≥ 3 and p + q ≤ n, where Λ′ represents the vector of the new
partition P ′ after the 1-deviation defined by α[p, q]. In other words, the 1-deviation from P to P ′ is
such that Λ′ − Λ = (0, . . . , 0, 1,−1, 0, . . . , 0,−1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) or Λ′ − Λ = (0, . . . , 0, 1,−2, 1, 0, . . . , 0).
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The definition above does not take into account the special case when q = 0. So, for any p such
that p ≥ 3 and p < n, we define the vector α[p] of size n such that for all j = 1, . . . , n, α[p]p = 1,
α[p]p−1 = −1, α[p]1 = −1, and α[p]j = 0 otherwise. We define the vector α[2] of size n such that for
all j = 1, . . . , n, α[2]2 = 1, α[2]1 = −2. and α[2]j = 0 otherwise. Given the vector Λ of a partition
P , the 1-deviation considered above is such that Λ′ = Λ + α[p], for some p, 2 ≤ p < n, where Λ′
represents the vector of the new partition after the 1-deviation defined by α[p]. In other words,
the 1-deviation from P to P ′ considered here is such that Λ′ − Λ = (0, . . . , 0, 1,−1, 0, . . . , 0,−1) or
Λ′ − Λ = (0, . . . , 0, 1,−2).
For any positive integers p, q, d such that p − d ≥ q + d and p + q ≤ n, we define the vector
α[p, p− d, q + d, q] = ∑d−1j=0 α[p− j, q + j]. If p− d > q + d, we get for all j = 1, . . . , n:
α[p, p− d, q + d, q]p = 1,
α[p, p− d, q + d, q]p−d = −1,
α[p, p− d, q + d, q]q+d = −1,
α[p, p− d, q + d, q]q = 1,
and α[p, p− d, q + d, q]j = 0 otherwise.
If p− d = q + d, we get for all j = 1, . . . , n:
α[p, p− d, q + d, q]p = 1,
α[p, p− d, q + d, q]p−d=q+d = −2,
α[p, p− d, q + d, q]q = 1,
and α[p, p− d, q + d, q]j = 0 otherwise.
We are now ready to present a sequence for the coloring game with a superpolynomial size.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the number of nodes is n = cL(L + 1)/2. The values
c and L will be defined later and we assume for the moment that c is sufficiently large. If in
truth cL(L + 1)/2 < n < (c + 1)L(L + 1)/2, then we only consider cL(L + 1)/2 nodes. More
precisely, the n− cL(L+ 1)/2 other nodes will never move and will stay in their n− cL(L+ 1)/2
respective singleton groups. Thus we can only consider the vectors and partitions induced by the
cL(L+ 1)/2 considered nodes. We first do a sequence of 1-deviations to get the partition P 0 such
that Λ0 = (0, . . . , 0, λL = c, . . . , λ1 = c) is the vector of P
0.
Using our notations, we observe that to get the partition P 0 we do the sequence defined by∑L
j=2 α[j] c times. Thus, one can check that Λ
0 = (0, . . . , 0, n) + c
∑L
j=2 α[j].
In the sequel, we will denote any sequence of deviations by φ[l], where l denotes the greatest
index j such that φj 6= 0. Observe that given any sequence of deviations defined by a vector φ[l],
the vector φ[l − i], i > 0, represents the same sequence of deviations in which any 4-deviation δ[p]
is replaced by δ[p − i] and any 1-deviation involving groups of sizes p and q, now involves groups
of sizes p− i and q − i.
Let t > 0 and T > 0 be such that 2T−1(2t2 + 2) ≤ L.
Claim 6 There exists a sequence of 1-deviations and 4-deviations from P 0 to a partition P 1 with
vector Λ1, where ζ1[L] = Λ1 − Λ0 is such that for all j = 1, . . . , n, ζ1[L]L = 1, ζ1[L]L−2 =
−1, ζ1[L]L−3 = −1, ζ1[L]L−t2 = 1, ζ1[L]L−t2−1 = 1, ζ1[L]L−2t2+2 = −1, ζ1[L]L−2t2+1 = −1,
ζ1[L]L−2t2−1 = 1, and ζ1[L]j = 0 otherwise.
Proof. [Claim 6] Set φ[L] = (
∑t2−1
j=0 δ[L− j]) +α[L− 1, L− 2, L− 2, L− 3] +α[L− t2, L− t2− 1, L−
t2 − 1, L− t2 − 2] + α[L− t2 − 3, L− t2 − 4, L− t2 − 5, L− t2 − 6] + α[L− 1, L− 3, L− 3, L− 5].
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Recall it means we do t2 consecutive 4-deviations, namely a cascade, then we adjust the resulting
partition using 4 sequences of 1-deviations. We get:
φ[L]j = 0 j = L+ 1, . . . , n
φ[L]L = 1
φ[L]L−1 = −1
φ[L]L−2 = −1
φ[L]j = 0 j = L− 3, L− 4
φ[L]L−5 = 1
φ[L]j = 0 j = L− t, . . . , L− 6
φ[L]L−t2−1 = 1
φ[L]j = 0 j = L− t2 − 3, L− t2 − 2
φ[L]L−t2−4 = −1
φ[L]L−t2−5 = −1
φ[L]L−t2−6 = 1
φ[L]j = 0 j = 1, . . . , L− t2 − 7.
We can then construct ζ1j [L] = (
∑t2−5
j=0 φ[L− j]) + α[L− 4, L− t2 + 1, L− t2 − 2, L− 2t2 + 3] +
α[L− t2 + 4, L− t2 + 2, L− t2 − 3, L− t2 − 5]. 
Claim 7 There is a constant c1 such that the sequence from P
0 to P 1 defined by ζ1[L] in Claim 6,
is c1-balanced.
Proof. [Claim 7] First, note that any k-deviation, k ≤ 4, changes a constant number of groups in
the partition. Thus, for any j, 0 ≤ j ≤ t2 − 5, the sequence defined by φ[L − j] is balanced for
some constant because, for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the number of deviations that change groups of size
i is constant. Furthermore, the vector φ[L − j] contains a constant number of non-zero values.
Thus for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the sequence defined by ∑t2−5j=0 φ[L − j] changes a constant number of
groups of size i. We conclude there exists a constant c1 such that the sequence induced by ζ
1[L] is
c1-balanced. 
Proof. [Claim 1] The vector φ′ has size s′ = (r − 1)d + s. Let us first suppose that r is even.
φ′ =
∑r/2−1
h=0 φ[L − hd] +
∑r−1
h=r/2 φ[L − hd]. We prove that, for any r′, 0 ≤ r′ ≤ r/2 − 1, φr
′
=∑r′
h=0 φ[L − hd] +
∑r−1
h=r−1−r′ φ[L − hd] has the symmetric property. Note that the size of φr
′
is
s′ = (r − 1)d+ s for any r′, 0 ≤ r′ ≤ r/2− 1.
By induction on r′. Suppose r′ = 0. We have φ0 = φ[L] + φ[L − (r − 1)d]. For any j,
L−(r−1)d−s+1 ≤ j ≤ L, φ0j = φj+φj+(r−1)d. As φ has the symmetric property and has size s, φ0j =
φL−s+1+L−j+φL−s+1+L−j−(r−1)d. Furthermore, φ0L−s′+1+L−j = φL−s′+1+L−j+φL−s′+1+L−j+(r−1)d.
Recall that s′ = (r−1)d+ s. Thus, φ0L−s′+1+L−j = φL−(r−1)d−s+1+L−j +φL−s+1+L−j . We get that,
for any j, L− s′ + 1 ≤ j ≤ L, φ0j = φ0L−s′+1+L−j , and so φ0 has the symmetric property.
Suppose it is true for r′, 0 ≤ r′ ≤ r/2− 1, we prove it is also true for r′ + 1. By the induction
hypothesis, vector φr
′
has the symmetric property. We have φr
′+1 = φr
′
+ φ[L− (r′ + 1)d] + φ[L−
(r− r′− 2)d]. First, if j > L− (r′+ 1)d, then φr′+1j −φr
′
j = 0 by construction. Also, φ
r′+1
j −φr
′
j = 0
for any j, L − s′ + 1 ≤ j ≤ L − (r − r′ − 2)d − s. For any j, L − (r − r′ − 2)d − s + 1 ≤ j ≤
L − (r′ + 1)d, φr′+1j − φr
′
j = φj−(r′+1)d + φj−(r−r′−2)d. We apply the proof of case r
′ = 0 to show
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that φ[L− (r′+ 1)d] + φ[L− (r− r′− 2)d] has the symmetric property. To conclude, it is sufficient
to show that L − (L − (r − r′ − 2)d − s + 1) = L − (r′ + 1)d − (L − s′ + 1), that is the sub-
vector of non-zero values of φ[L − (r′ + 1)d] + φ[L − (r − r′ − 2)d] is in the middle of φ′. Indeed,
(r − r′ − 2)d+ s− 1) = −(r′ + 1)d+ s′ − 1, and so (r − r′ − 2)d+ s− 1) = −(r′ + 1)d+ s′ − 1. As
s′ = (r−1)d+s, rd−r′d−2d+s−1 = −r′d−d+rd−d+s−1, and so L−(L−(r−r′−2)d−s+1) =
L− (r′ + 1)d− (L− s′ + 1). Thus, φ′ has the symmetric property.
Finally, for any r′, 0 ≤ r′ ≤ r/2 − 1, φr′ has the symmetric property. We get that φ′ has the
symmetric property too.
Consider now that r is odd. Using the previous induction, we prove that the vector
∑(r−1)/2−1
h=0 φ[L−
hd]+
∑r−1
h=(r−1)/2+1 φ[L−hd] has the symmetric property. We now prove that φ′ =
∑(r−1)/2−1
h=0 φ[L−
hd] +
∑r−1
h=(r−1)/2+1 φ[L− hd] +φ[L− d(r− 1)/2] has the symmetric property. To do that we prove
that the non-zero part of the vector φ[L − d(r − 1)/2] is exactly in the middle of the vector∑(r−1)/2−1
h=0 φ[L− hd] +
∑r−1
h=(r−1)/2+1. In other words, the non-zero sub-vector of φ[L− d(r− 1)/2]
starts at index L − d(r − 1)/2 and ends at index L − d(r − 1)/2 − s + 1, and we show that
L−(L−d(r−1)/2) = (L−d(r−1)/2−s+1)−(L−s′+1). Indeed, d(r−1)/2 = −d(r−1)/2−s+s′,
and so d(r − 1) = s′ − s. Recall that s′ = (r − 1)d+ s. Thus, φ′ has the symmetric property. 
Proof. [Claim 2] By induction on i. The sequence ζ1 defined in Claim 6 has the Good Property.
Consider i, 1 ≤ i ≤ T − 1. Suppose ζi[L] has the Good Property. We prove that there exists a
sequence of 1-deviations ξi+1 such that ζi+1[L] =
∑a1
j=0 ζ
i[L− jt1i ] + ξi+1 has the Good Property.
Set ϕi+1 =
∑ai
j=0 ζ
i[L − jt1i ]. By construction, for all j, L − t2i+1 ≤ j ≤ L, we get ϕi+1L = 1,
ϕi+1
L−t1i+1
= −1, ϕi+1
L−t2i+1
= −1, and ϕi+1j = 0 otherwise, where t1i+1 = t2i and t2i+1 = 2t1i . We get
1 < t1i+1 < t
2
i+1 because 1 < t
2
i < 2t
1
i by the induction hypothesis. Also, t
2
i+1 < 2t
1
i+1 because
2t1i < 2t
2
i . Finally, t
2
i+1 ≤ 2i+1 because t2i+1 < 2t1i+1 = 2t2i ≤ 2i2.
For now we abuse the notation setting si+1 the size of the vector ϕ
i+1. We will prove later that
ϕi+1 and ζi+1 have same size. Furthermore si+1 = ait
1
i + si. As ai and si are even integers, then
si+1 is even. Note that si+1 ≤ 2si.
By Claim 1, ϕi+1 has the symmetric property: ϕi+1L−j = ϕ
i+1
L−si+1+1+j for all j, 0 ≤ j ≤ si+1 − 1.
Moreover, by the choice of ai, we get that:
ϕi+1j ∈

{−1, 0} if L− si2 + 2 ≤ j ≤ L− t2i+1 − 1
{0, 1} if L− si + 1 + t1i ≤ j ≤ L− si2 + 1
{−1, 0} if L− si+1 + 1 + t1i+1 ≤ j ≤ L− si + t1i .
Furthermore:
∑L−t2i+1−1
j=L− si
2
+2
ϕi+1j +
∑L−si+t1i
j=L−si+1+1+t1i+1
ϕi+1j
= −∑L− si2 +1
j=L−si+1+t1i
ϕi+1j − 2.
We now show that ϕi+1L−si+1/2 = ϕ
i+1
L−si+1/2+1 = 1. As ζ
i[L]L−si/2+1 = 1, then ϕ
i+1
L−si/2+ai2 (t1i−1)+1
=
1. Also, ϕi+1
L−si/2+ai2 (t1i−1)+2
= 1. As ai is even, we get ϕ
i+1
L−si+1/2+1 = 1 because
si
2 +
ai
2 =
si+1
2 .
Recall that si+1 = ai(t
1
i − 1) + si. Thus, ϕi+1L−si+1/2 = 1.
We now prove that there exists a sequence of 1-deviations ξi+1 such that ζi+1[L] = ϕi+1 + ξi+1
has the Good Property. Consider any j1, j2 > 0, L− si2 + 2 ≤ j1 ≤ L− t2i+1− 1, L− si+12 + 2 ≤ j2 ≤
L− si2 +1, such that ϕi+1j1 = −1, ϕi+1j2 = 1. As ϕi+1 has the symmetric property (Claim 1), then there
exists a 1-deviation defined by α[j1, j2, j3, j4], with j1 − j2 = j3 − j4, such that ϕi+1j1 = ϕi+1j4 = −1
and ϕi+1j2 = ϕ
i+1
j3
= 1.
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This deviation clearly keeps the symmetric property. We can repeat that, with a different 4-
tuple of indices, until having the Good Property and so the vector ζi+1[L]. 
Proof. [Claim 3] We prove the result by induction on i. Claim 7 proves the result for i = 1.
Suppose it is true for all i′ ≤ i ≤ T − 1. We prove that it is true for i+ 1. Recall that we first build
ϕi+1 =
∑ai
j=0 ζ
i[L− jt1i ] where ai is the largest even integer j such that L− jt1i − t2i > L− si/2 + 1.
For all b, 0 ≤ b ≤ ai, consider µb =
∑b
j=0 ζ
i[L− jt1i ]. We prove that the sequence of deviations
from ζi to µb is (c1+i)-balanced. By induction on b. It is true for b = 0. Indeed by the first induction
hypothesis, the sequence ζi[L] is (c1 + i − 1)-balanced. Suppose it is true for all b′ ≤ b ≤ ai − 1.
We prove it is true for b+ 1. By Claim 2, µb is 1-balanced because ζi[L] is 1-balanced (the values
of the vector belong to the set {−1, 0, 1}). By definition µb+1 = yb + ζi[L − (b + 1)t1i ]. By the
first induction hypothesis, each sequence of ζi[L − (b + 1)t1i ] is (c1 + i − 1)-balanced. Since µb is
1-balanced, the sequence from µb to µb+1, is (c1 + i)-balanced. Thus, ϕ
i+1 is (c1 + i)-balanced.
To conclude, it remains to prove that the sequence from ϕi+1 to ζi+1, is (c1 + i)-balanced.
Consider the last 1-deviations described in the proof of Claim 2. Every deviation consists in
replacing values −1 and 1 by 0. Thus, ζi+1 is (c1 + i)-balanced. 
Proof. [Claim 4] |Si+1| = ai|Si| with ai is the largest even integer j such that L−jt1i−t2i > L−si/2+1.
As t2i ≤ 2i+1, ai is the largest even integer such that j < si2i+2− 12i−1. We get ai ≥ b si2i+2− 12i−1c−2,
and so |Si+1| ≥ ( si2i+2 − 6)|Si|. 
Proof. [Claim 5] By Claim 4, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ T − 1, |Si+1| ≥ ( si2i+2 − 6)|Si|. As si ≤ si+1 for
all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ T − 1, then |ST | ≥ ( s12T+1 − 6)T−1|S1|. Thus, |ST | ≥ ( 2t
2+2
2log2(t)+2
− 6)log2(t)|S1|, and so
|ST | ≥ O(tlog2(t))|S1|. 
7.2 Appendix 2: proofs of Section 4
We start this section with a tool to lower-bound the variations of the global utility in a more general
setting:
Lemma 12 Given a graph G = (V,w), let P be a partition of the nodes, let S = {u1, . . . , uk} be a
k-set that breaks P , and let P ′ be the resulting partition. Then:
f(P ′)− f(P ) ≥ 2[k −∑1≤i,j≤k wuiuj +∑{ui,uj |X(ui)=X(uj)}wuiuj ].
Proof. In the sequel, we will call X ′ the group in P that all the vertices in S agree to join with.
As S breaks the partition P , the utility of each vertex increases by at least 1. So, we get as the
variation of the utility for the k-set:
∑k
i=1[fui(P
′)− fui(P )] ≥ k.
For every 1 ≤ i ≤ k, we then define δi =
∑
v∈X(ui)\S wuiv and σi =
∑
uj∈X(ui)wujui ; we define
δ′i =
∑
v∈X′ wuiv and σ
′
i =
∑k
j=1wuiuj in a similar way. Then, fui(P ) = δi+σi and fui(P
′) = δ′i+σ
′
i;
so, we get by summation that
∑k
i=1 fui(P ) =
∑k
i=1 δi + 2
∑
{ui,uj |X(ui)=X(uj)}wuiuj ,∑k
i=1 fui(P
′) =
∑k
i=1 δ
′
i + 2
∑
1≤i,j≤k wuiuj .
Note that we have a factor 2 for any occurence of wuiuj , as it is counted once for ui and once for
uj .
Furthermore, the variation of the global utility includes that of the nodes in S, that of the nodes
in X ′, plus that of the nodes in X(ui) \S for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k. In other words, we get by symmetry
that:
f(P ′)− f(P ) = ∑ki=1[fui(P ′)− fui(P )] +∑ki=1[δ′i − δi]
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= 2
∑k
i=1[fui(P
′)− fui(P )]− 2
∑
1≤i,j≤k wuiuj + 2
∑
{ui,uj |X(ui)=X(uj)}wuiuj
≥ 2k − 2∑1≤i,j≤k wuiuj + 2∑{ui,uj |X(ui)=X(uj)}wuiuj . 
Proof. [Theorem 5] Let P, P ′ be two partitions of the nodes for the same graph G = (V,w). We
assume that there is a user u such that {u} breaks P , and the resulting partition is P ′. Then, by
Lemma 12, we get that f(P ′)− f(P ) ≥ 2. So, the global utility increases at each step of the game,
and it is upper bounded by O(wpn
2). 
7.3 Proof of Corollary 2
Let us first show that k(W) ≥ 2. In fact, Theorem 13 is a global stability result, which is more
precise and uses structural properties of the graphs. Given a graph G = (V,w), let us define the
”friendship graph” G+ = (V,E+) of G, where E+ = {uv ∈ E : wuv > 0}. We remind that the girth
of a graph is the length of its shortest cycle. By definition, an acyclic graph has infinite girth.
Theorem 13 Given an integer k ≥ 1 and a graph G = (V,w) with W ⊆ {−∞, 0, 1} ∪ −N, there
exists a k-stable partition for G if the girth of the friendship graph G+ is at least k+1. Furthermore,
the system always reaches a k-stable partition in O(n2) steps in that case.
Proof. As in the case k = 1, we will prove the global utility strictly increases after any k-deviation.
Let P be any partition for G, such that there is no vertices u and v with wuv = −∞ and X(u) =
X(v). If P is k-stable, we are done. Otherwise there exists a subset S = {u1, u2, . . . , u|S|}, |S| ≤ k,
such that S breaks P . Let P ′ be the resulting partition for G after the k-deviation. By Lemma 12
we have: f(P ′)− f(P ) ≥ 2[|S| −∑{ui,uj |X(ui)6=X(uj)}wuiuj ]
≥ 2[|S| −∑{ui,uj |X(ui) 6=X(uj)}max (0, wuiuj )]
≥ 2[|S| − |E+ ∩ S × S|]
≥ 2, because the girth is at least k + 1 by the hypothesis. 
Particularly, if G+ is cycle-free, then we get there is a k-stable partition for G, for any k ≥ 1; if
G+ is triangle-free, then there always exists a 3-stable partition for G. Furthermore, as the girth of
any graph is at least 3, then there always exists a 2-stable partition. Theorem 13 also shows that
such a coloring game (with fixed set of weights W) takes at most O(n2) steps to converge. Using
another sequence construction, one can prove that this bound is indeed tight in the general case.
Lemma 13 There exists G = (V,w) with W = {0, 1} such that there is a sequence of θ(n2) 1-
deviations for G.
Proof. Let any p ≥ 1. We build G as follows. Without loss of generality assume n = 3p. Let
V = V1 ∪ V2 ∪ V3 with |V1| = |V2| = |V3| = p.
For any u, v ∈ V2 ∪ V3, wuv = 1. For any u, v ∈ V1, wuv = 0. For any u ∈ V1, for any v ∈ V2,
wuv = 1.
We now set V1 = {u1, u2, . . . , up} and V2 = {v1, v2, . . . , vp}. Consider the partition P such that
any node of V1 ∪ V2 forms a singleton group and there is group formed by all the nodes of V3.
Sequentially, each node of V1 reaches the group of v1. The utility of v1 is now p. Then v1
reaches the group composed of all nodes of V3. The utility of v1 is now p + 1, and the utility of
each ui is 0. The number of 1-deviations is p + 1. We repeat the same process for v2 using p + 1
1-deviations. And so on for each vi, 3 ≤ i ≤ p.
Finally, the number of 1-deviations is (p+ 1)p = θ(n2). 
As it was announced, the combination of Theorem 13 and Lemma 13 yields a proof of Lemma 2.
We now define the notion of twin vertices and we prove a useful lemma.
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Definition 8 Let G = (V,w) be a graph, and u, u′ ∈ V be two users. We say that u and u′ are
twins if and only if wuu′ > 0 and for all vertex v ∈ V \ {u, u′} wuv = wu′v.
Lemma 14 Given a graph G, and a 1-stable partition P for G, then X(u) = X(u′) for all vertices
u, u′ such that u and u′ are twins.
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose X(u) 6= X(u′). By symmetry, we can assume fu(P ) ≤ fu′(P ).
Thus, {u} breaks the partition, as vertex u joins the group of u′ because, in this new partition P ′
for the nodes, we get fu(P
′) = fu′(P ) + wuu′ > fu(P ). A contradiction. Hence X(u) = X(u′). 
Finally, we show that there exists a graph G such that any partition for G is not 3-stable
(k({−∞, 0, 1}) ≤ 2). The proof is all the more counter-intuitive as it implies there are infinite
sequences of deviations that do not change the global utility, even in graphs with only four edges
weighted by 0!
Proof. [Lemma 3] The set of vertices consists of four sets Ai, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, each of equal size h ≥ 2
and with a special vertex ai, plus four vertices bi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, and two vertices c0 and c1. In what
follows, indices are taken modulo 2 for cj , j ∈ {0, 1}, and they are taken modulo 4 everywhere else.
Figure 5 represents the example with h = 3.
The friendship graph G+ here consists of all the edges with weight 1; the set E+ contains:
1. all the edges between nodes in Ai (0 ≤ i ≤ 3);
2. edges between bi and Ai (0 ≤ i ≤ 3);
3. edges between bi and Ai+1 \ {ai+1} (0 ≤ i ≤ 3);
4. edges between bi and bi−1 and bi+1 (0 ≤ i ≤ 3);
5. edges between c0 and all the bi, and edges between c1 and all the bi;
6. edges between c0 and A0 ∪A2, and edges between c1 and A1 ∪A3.
Moreover, there are four edges with weight 0, namely the edges biai+1. All the remaining edges
have weight −∞. That is two nodes in different Ai, Ai′ are enemies; a user bi is enemy of bi+2 and
of the nodes in Ai+2 and Ai+3; c0 and c1 are enemies; c0 is enemy of the nodes in A1 and A3, and
c1 is enemy of the nodes in A0 and A2.
We now assume there exists a 3-stable partition P for G.
Claim 8 Every Ai is a subgroup in P .
Proof. [Claim 8] First, all the nodes in Ai \ {ai} are in the same group by Lemma 14, as all the
vertices in this subset are pairwise twins. Now assume that ai is not in the same group as Ai \{ai}.
Note that the nodes in Ai have the same enemies, they all have bi and ci as friends (recall that
the index for ci is taken modulo 2), but the nodes in Ai \ {ai} also have bi−1 as a friend whereas
waibi−1 = 0. So, we have X(ai) ⊆ {ai, bi, bi−1, ci}. This implies all the nodes in X(ai) have at least
one friend and no enemy in the group in P that contains Ai \ {ai}.
If |X(ai)| ≤ 3 we can merge this group with the one that contains Ai \ {ai} using a 3-deviation.
Otherwise, P contains groups {ai, bi, bi−1, ci} and Ai \ {ai}. If h ≥ 4, then |Ai \ {ai}| ≥ 3 and so,
ai has an incentive to join Ai \ {ai}. Otherwise, we have |Ai \ {ai}| ≤ 2, hence we can merge the
two groups using a 2-deviation. 
Claim 9 bi is in the same group as Ai or Ai+1.
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Proof. [Claim 9] Suppose it is not the case. Then X(bi) contains at most two other nodes: one
of bi−1 and bi+1 (together enemies), and one of c0 and c1 (enemies). If |X(bi)| ≤ 2 or the group
containing Ai has size at least 3, then bi has an incentive to leave her group. So, we assume
|X(bi)| = 3, h = 2 and Ai is a group of size h = 2 in P . There are two cases. If X(bi) = X(ci) then
we can merge X(bi) with Ai using the 2-deviation {bi, ci}. Otherwise, ci−1 is in X(bi), and X(bi)
also contains either bi−1 or bi+1; hence we can break P using the vertex in {bi−1, bi+1}∩X(bi) with
ci−1. 
Claim 10 There exists an i such that Ai, bi and bi−1 are in the same group.
Proof. [Claim 10] Again, we show the claim by contradiction. We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: bi−1 is with Ai, but not bi. So, as the claim is supposed to be false, bi is with Ai+1, bi+1
is with Ai+2, and bi+2 is with Ai+3. Either we have X(bi−1) = X(ci), hence bi has an incentive to
join X(bi−1), or X(bi−1) 6= X(ci), hence {bi, ci} joins group X(bi−1).
Case 2: bi is with Ai, but not bi−1. So, as the claim is supposed to be false, bi−1 is with Ai−1,
bi+1 is with Ai+1, and bi+2 is with Ai+2. Note that ci is either in X(bi) or in X(bi+2). Without loss
of generality, suppose it is in X(bi+2). Either we have X(bi−1) = X(ci−1), hence bi has an incentive
to join X(bi−1), or X(bi−1) 6= X(ci−1), hence {bi, ci−1} joins group X(bi−1). 
Claim 11 There exists an i, such that bi, bi−1 and ci are in the same group as Ai in P . Moreover,
such a group is unique in P , due to the conflict graph in G.
The proof of Claim 11 is straightforward by using the previous claim. By symmetry, we assume
that P contains the group {b0, b3, c0} ∪A0.
Case 1: the group containing A2 also contains b1 and b2. Then either c1 is with A1 and a
1-deviation of b1 to A1 ∪ {c1} breaks P , or c1 is not with A1 and a 2-deviation of {b1, c1} to A1
breaks P .
Case 2: the group containing A2 only contains b2. Then either c1 is with A3 and a 2-deviation
of {b2, b3} to A3 breaks P , or c1 is not with A3 and a 3-deviation of {b2, b3, c1} to A3 breaks P .
Case 3: the group containing A2 only contains b1. In that case, a 1-deviation from b1 to the
group containing A1 breaks P .
Case 4: A2 is a group in P . This implies b2 is with A3. Then either c1 is with A3 and a
1-deviation of b3 to A3 breaks P , or c1 is not with A3 and a 2-deviation of {b3, c1} to A3 breaks P .
Finally, there does not exist a 3-stable partition P for G. 
Corollary 2 Let W = {−∞, 0, 1}. Then k(W) = 2.
7.4 Counter-examples for stability
Counter-examples with a different set of weights are presented in the sequel. First, observe the
weights 2, 3, 4 in the counter-example of Figure 2 can be replaced by any weights w1, w2, w3 such
that w1 < w2 < w3, and w1 + w2 > w3. Especially, they can be replaced by b, b+ 1, b+ 2, for any
b ≥ 2. We now show through a counter-example, no 2-stable partition exists in general when W
contains two positive elements, even when the zero is not present.
Lemma 15 Let a, b be two positive integers such that a < b. There is a graph G = (V,w) with
W = {−∞, a, b} such that there is no 2-stable partition for G.
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Proof.[Lemma 15] Users are partitioned into four sets V1 = {x1, x2, x3}, V2 = {y1, y2, y3}, V3 =
{z1, z2, z3} and {u1, u2, u3}. Each of these sets is a clique with weight b. Moreover, all the edges
that lie between V1 and V2, V2 and V3, and V3 and V1 have weight −∞. We also set that for all
vertices xi ∈ V1, for all vertices yj ∈ V2, and for all vertices zl ∈ V3, wxiu1 = wyju2 = wzlu3 = b,
whereas wxiu3 = wyju1 = wzlu2 = −∞. Finally:
• wu1z1 = wu1z2 = b; wu1z3 = a;
• wu2x1 = wu2x2 = b; wu2x3 = a;
• wu3y1 = wu3y2 = b; wu3y3 = a.
We now assume there exists a 2-stable partition P for G.
Claim 12 V1, V2 and V3 are subgroups in P .
Proof. By symmetry, it suffices to show the claim for V1. First, we have that {x1, x2} is a subgroup
in P by Lemma 14. Remark that all the vertices in V1 have the same enemies in the graph.
Moreover, the sum of the positive weights that lie between x3 and V \ V1 equals b + a, which is
lower than 2b. Hence V1 is a subgroup of P because we suppose P to be 1-stable. 
Then, we can replace subsets V1, V2, V3 with three nodes v1, v2, v3 in the obvious way. In so
doing, we get the variation of Figure 2 with weights w1 = b, w2 = 2b+ a and w3 = 3b. Moreover, it
is important in the counter-example of Figure 2 to remark that one can always find a 2-deviation
using nodes u1, u2 and u3 only. As a consequence, such a 2-deviation is valid for G and so, there
does not exist any 2-stable partition for G. 
Other results can be expressed in a convenient way using the subset of non-negative weights
W+ and the subset of non-positive weightsW−. These two subsets entirely cover the set of weights
W, but they may not be disjoint whenever 0 ∈ W.
Corollary 3 Suppose {−∞, N} is a strict subset of W. Then, k(W) = 1 if W+ \ {N} 6= ∅, and
k(W) ≤ 2 otherwise.
Proof. [Corollary 3] First assume there exists a weight a ∈ W+\{N}. Then we can apply Lemma 15
with the subset {−∞, a,N}.
Otherwise, we have by Lemma 3 there exists a graph G0 = (V0, w
0) with {−∞, 0, 1} such that
there does not exist any 3-stable partition for G0. Let a ∈ W \ {−∞, N} be any weight. Note that
a may be positive or non positive for this construction. We define G1 = (V0, w
1) with the same
conflict edges as for G0, such that for all vertices u, v ∈ V0, w1uv = N if w0uv = 1, w1uv = a if w0uv = 0.
As there does not exist any 3-stable partition for G0, there does not exist any 3-stable partition for
G1 either. 
Lemma 16 Let a, b be two positive integers. There exists a graph G = (V,w) with W = {−a, b}
such that any partition for G is not 2(b+ a+ 1)-stable.
Proof.[Lemma 16] Our aim in this case is to emulate the variation of Figure 2 with the three weights
w1 = b+ a+ 1, w2 = 2(b+ a) + 3, and w3 = 3(b+ a+ 1). As b+ a+ 1 < 2(b+ a) + 3 < 3(b+ a+ 1),
and b+ a+ 1 + 2(b+ a) + 3 = 3(b+ a+ 1) + 1 > 3(b+ a+ 1), this change of weights does not make
2-stable partitions exist for the graph.
To do that, let t1, t2, t3 be any three positive integers that satisfy the following properties:
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• t3 ≥ t2 ≥ t1;
• t1 ≥ 5(b+ a+ 1)/max(b− a, 1);
• max(t1b, (t1 + 1)a+ 2(b+ a) + 3).a ≥ (3(b+ a) + 2)b+ 1;
• max(t2b, (t2 + 1)a+ 2(b+ a) + 3).a ≥ [(t1 + 5)(b+ a) + 4]b+ 1;
• max(t3b, (t3 + 1)a+ 2(b+ a) + 3).a ≥ [(t2 + 5)(b+ a) + 4]b+ 1.
We can note the possible values of those three integers are infinite. Indeed, the value of t1 can be
any value that is greater than every of its (finite) lower bounds. Furthermore, if the value of t1 is
arbitrarily fixed, then we can also choose for t2 any value that is sufficiently large and, finally, the
value of t3 can be chosen in the same way, depending on the values of t1 and t2.
For every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, we also define the size si = ti(b+a)+3(b+a+1) = (ti+1)(b+a)+2(b+a)+3.
We now define the graph G = (V,w). The vertices consist in three subsets V1, V2 and V3, plus three
other subsets U1, U2 and U3. All of them are cliques with weight b. Furthermore, Ui has size b+a+1
and Vi has size si, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. There are also two distinct subcliques Vi,m ⊂ Vi,p ⊂ Vi, with
|Vi,m| = tib, |Vi,p| = (ti + 1)b.
We set wuu′ = b for any u, u
′ ∈ U1 ∪ U2 ∪ U3, and in addition, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3:
• wuivi = b for every ui ∈ Ui, vi ∈ Vi \ Vi,m;
• wuivi+1 = b, for every ui ∈ Ui, vi+1 ∈ Vi+1 \ Vi+1,p (with the convention Vi+1 = V1 when
i = 3).
Every other weight equals −a.
By contradiction. Now assume there is a 2(b+a+1)-stable partition of the nodes P . By Lemma 14,
it comes that subsets U1, U2, U3, V1,m, V2,m, V3,m, V1 \ V1,p, V2 \ V2,p, V3 \ V3,p are subgroups in P .
Claim 13 For every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3:
• if a ≥ b then |Vi,p|+ 2(b+ a+ 1) ≤ |Vi \ Vi,p|,
• if b > a then |Vi \ Vi,m|+ 2(b+ a+ 1) ≤ |Vi,m|.
Proof. By the hypothesis, we have |Vi,p| = (ti + 1)b, hence |Vi \ Vi,p| = si − (ti + 1)b = (ti +
1)(b + a) + 2(b + a) + 3 − (ti + 1)b = (ti + 1)a + 2(b + a) + 3; furthermore, |Vi,m| = tib, and so,
|Vi \ Vi,m| = si − tib = ti(b+ a) + 3(b+ a+ 1)− tib = tia+ 3(b+ a+ 1).
First if a ≥ b, then |Vi,p|+2(b+a+1) = (ti+1)b+2(b+a+1) < (ti+1)a+2(b+a)+3 = |Vi\Vi,p|,
and the claim is proved. Otherwise, the equation |Vi \ Vi,m|+ 2(b+ a+ 1) ≤ |Vi,m| is equivalent to
the following lines:
tia+ 3(b+ a+ 1) + 2(b+ a+ 1) ≤ tib
5(b+ a+ 1) ≤ ti(b− a)
5(b+ a+ 1)/(b− a) ≤ ti
and the claim is also proved, as ti ≥ t1 ≥ 5(b+ a+ 1)/max(b− a, 1). 
In the sequel, we will denote V ′i = Vi \ Vi,p if a ≥ b, and V ′i = Vi,m if b > a. We recall that V ′i is
a subgroup in P by the previous claim.
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Claim 14 For any j < i, none of the vertices in Vj is in the same group in P as vertices of V
′
i .
Proof. Indeed, any vertex in Vj has at most sj − 1 + 2(b + a + 1) = (tj + 1)(b + a) + 2(b + a) +
3 + 2(b + a + 1) − 1 = (tj + 5)(b + a) + 4 friends in its group. Moreover, [(tj + 5)(b + a) + 4]b <
max(tib, (ti + 1)a+ 2(b+ a) + 3).a = |V ′i |a by the hypothesis. 
Claim 15 Subsets U1 and V
′
3 are not in the same group in P .
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose U1 ∪ V ′3 is a subgroup in P . By the previous claim, there can be
no vertex of V1∪V2 in this group. Thus, any vertex of U1 has at most 2(b+a+1)+b+a = 3(b+a)+2
friends in its group. Furthermore, as |V ′3 |a = max(t3b, (t3 +1)a+2(b+a)+3).a ≥ (3(b+a)+2)b+1,
we have that any vertex of U1 has a negative utility, which is a contradiction because P is 1-stable.

In the same way, one can check that U2 and V
′
1 are not in the same group in P , U3 and V
′
2 are
not in the same group in P .
Claim 16 For any 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, Vi is a subgroup in P .
Proof. By our first claim, |V3 \ V ′3 |+ 2(b+ a+ 1) ≤ |V3|′, and by our third claim, there can be no
vertex u in the same group as V ′3 in P such that wuv3 = −a for any vertex v3 ∈ V3. Consequently,
V3 is a subgroup in P , as any vertex of V3 \ V ′3 that would not be in the same group as V ′3 would
break the partition. 
It directly follows that V2 is a subgroup in P , hence V1 is a subgroup in P .
Consequently, subsets V1, V2, V3, U1, U2 and U3 can be replaced with vertices v1, v2, v3, u1, u2
and u3 in the obvious way. We get the variation of Figure 2 that we announced at the beginning
of the proof. Observe we can mimic any 2-deviation involving nodes u1, u2 or u3 in this reduced
graph by a 2(b+ a+ 1)-deviation involving subsets U1, U2 or U3 in G. So, there does not exist any
2(b+ a+ 1)-stable partition for G. 
Theorem 14 k(W) = ∞ ⇔ W = W+, or W = W−, or W = {−∞, b}, or W = W− ∪ {N} and
−∞ /∈ W.
Proof. [Theorem 14] First, suppose that W is not of one of the forms we propose. Let a, b be two
positive integers. If −a, b ∈ W then k(W) ≤ 2(a+ b) + 1 by Lemma 16. So, we will assume either
−∞ is the only negative weight in W, or −∞ ∈ W and N is the only positive weight in W. In the
first case, let wp denote the largest positive weight in W; then, either there exists a positive integer
a < wp such that a ∈ W, hence k(W) = 1 by Lemma 15, orW = {−∞, 0, wp} and so, k(W) = 2 by
Corollary 2. In the second case, k(W) ≤ 2 by Corollary 3. We deduce that k(W) is upper-bounded
in all the other cases, by the lemmas that are in Section 4.
Now, for the ’if part’, we start the proof with a preliminary remark. Let G = (V,w) be any
graph, and let P be any 1-stable partition for G. For any node u ∈ V , fu(P ) ≥
∑
v∈V min(wuv, 0)
and fu(P ) ≤
∑
v∈V max(wuv, 0).
Let W = W+. By the first remark, fu(P ) ≤
∑
v∈V max(wuv, 0) for any node u ∈ V and for any
stable partition P for G. In our case,
∑
v∈V max(wuv, 0) =
∑
v∈V wuv because wuv ≥ 0 for any
uv ∈ E. Let P = (V ) be the partition for G composed of 1 group of size n. By construction, for
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any node u ∈ V , fu(P ) =
∑
v∈V wuv. Thus P is a k-stable partition for G.
Let W = W−. By the very first remark, fu(P ) ≤
∑
v∈V max(wuv, 0) for any node u ∈ V and for
any stable partition P for G. In our case,
∑
v∈V max(wuv, 0) =
∑
v∈V 0 = 0 because wuv ≤ 0 for
any uv ∈ E. Let us denote V = {u1, . . . , un}. Let P = ({u1}, . . . , {un}) be the partition for G
composed of n groups of size 1. P is a k-stable partition for G because fu(P ) = 0 for any u ∈ V .
The case W = {−∞, b} is proved in [26].
Let W = W− ∪ {N} such that −∞ /∈ W. Let G′ = (V,E′) be the graph induced by the set of
arcs E′ = {uv,wuv = N}. Let G1, . . . , Gt be the different connected components of G′. Given a
node u ∈ V , let ΓG′(u) be the set of neighbors of u in graph G′. Formally ΓG′(u) = {v, uv ∈ E′}.
By the preliminary remark, we get that, for any stable partition P for G and for any node u ∈ V ,
fu(P ) ≤ N |ΓG′(u)|.
Let P = (V (G1), . . . , V (Gt)) be the partition for G composed of the nodes of the different maximal
connected components of G. By Definition of N , fu(P ) ≥ (N − 1)|ΓG(u)|.
We now prove that P is k-stable. By contradiction. Suppose that there exists a k-deviation. Let
P ′ be the partition for G obtained after the k-deviation. There are two cases.
• A subset S ⊂ V (Gi), for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ t, |S| ≤ k, forms a new group. In that case, we prove
that at least one node u ∈ S is such that fu(P ′) ≤ fu(P ). Indeed, consider a node u ∈ S such
that ΓG′(u) ∩ S 6= ΓG′(u). Note that there always exists such a node because |S| < |V (Gi)|
and V (Gi) is a maximal connected component of G. Thus, we get fu(P
′) ≤ (N − 1)|ΓG′(u)|
while fu(P ) ≥ max((N − 1), 0)|ΓG′(u)|. So fu(P ′) ≤ fu(P ). A contradiction.
• A subset S ⊂ V , |S| ≤ k, reaches a group V (Gj), for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ t. If V (Gi) ∩ S 6= ∅,
then we claim V (Gi) ⊂ S. Otherwise, we would have fP ′(u) ≤ fu(P ) for some u ∈ V (Gi).
Indeed, consider a node u ∈ S such that ΓG′(u) ∩ S 6= ΓG′(u). So fu(P ′) ≤ (N − 1)|ΓG′(u)|
while fu(P ) ≥ (N − 1)|ΓG′(u)|. Thus, if V (Gi) ∩ S 6= ∅, then V (Gi) ⊂ S. Consider a set
V (Gi), for some i, such that V (Gi) ⊂ S. In that case, fu(P ) ≤ fu(P ′) for any u ∈ V (Gi)
because wuv ≤ 0 for any v ∈ V \ V (Gi). A contradiction.
There does not exist a k-deviation for P and so P is k-stable. 
7.4.1 Proof of Theorem 6
First, given a set of weights W such that W+ 6= ∅, we recall that wp ∈ W is defined as the
largest positive weight inW. Observe that wp may equal the arbitrary value N in the general case.
Furthermore, as the set W is fixed, we can assume without loss of generality the value N is a fixed
polynomial of n; hence wp is either constant or polynomial.
Then we present two different ways to increase the minimum utility of the nodes in a graph.
In the general case, that minimum utility equals 0; otherwise, the partition of the nodes is not
even 1-stable. However, we can improve it with external cliques, in a way that keeps the stability
properties of the graph safe. Given a graph G = (V,w) and a positive integer t, we build the graph
G˜t by adding to the set of vertices n cliques of t nodes. We further impose that all the nodes in the
same t-clique have weight between them and between the vertices in V equal to wp, whereas they
have a conflict edge with any other vertex in the remaining t-cliques. By doing so, we intuitively
increase the minimal utility of the nodes to wpt for any stable partition of the graph. Note that
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the transformation also keeps the stability properties of the graph safe, which can be formalized as
follows:
Definition 9 Let W be any fixed set of weights such that W+ 6= ∅. Given a graph G = (V,w) and
a positive integer t, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n we can define the clique graph Kit = (Vi, wi) with t nodes
and the set of weights {wp}. The graph G˜t = (V˜ , w˜) is then built as follows:
• V˜ = V ∪⋃ni=1 Vi;
• for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, for all ui ∈ Vi, and for all uj ∈ Vj, w˜uiuj = wp if i = j, w˜uiuj = −∞
otherwise;
• for all u, v ∈ V , w˜uv = wuv;
• for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for all ui ∈ Vi and for all vertex v ∈ V , w˜uiv = wp.
Lemma 17 LetW be any fixed set of weights such thatW+ 6= ∅, and k be a positive integer. Given
a graph G = (V,w), and a positive integer t such that t > n, there exists a k-stable partition of the
nodes for G if and only if there exists a k-stable partition for G˜t.
Proof. [Lemma 17] Let P = (X1, . . . , Xn) be a k-stable partition of the nodes for G. We claim that
P ′ = (X1 ∪ V (K1t ), . . . , Xn ∪ V (Knt )) is a k-stable partition for G˜t. By contradiction. Assume that
P ′ is not k-stable, and let S be a k-set that breaks P ′. First, we claim that for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, S
cannot be a subset of V (Kit). This is clear as all the vertices in K
i
t have enemies in every non-empty
group of P ′ that is not their own group; in addition, they only have friends in their group in P ′, and
all of them are already in the same group. Then it follows that S′ = S ∩ V (G) 6= ∅. Moreover, we
claim that S′ breaks P . Indeed, after the k-deviation, the vertices in S′ end in the same group as
a (possibly empty) subset of Kit for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let 1 ≤ j ≤ n such that Xj ∩ (V (G) \S′) = ∅.
Such an integer j exists, because there are at most n non-empty groups in P . Then it follows that
if we move S′ into the group Xj , it is still a valid k-deviation for P ′ and so, we can mimic this
k-deviation in P . A contradiction. Therefore P ′ is k-stable.
Conversely, assume that there is no k-stable partition for G, whereas there exists a k-stable partition
P ′ = (X ′1, . . . , X ′n) for G˜t. Particularly, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we get that Kit is a subgroup of P ′ by
Lemma 14. Furthermore, we claim that for all vertex u ∈ V , there exists an integer i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
such that Kit ⊂ X(u). This directly comes from the fact that t > n and that wp is the largest
positive weight in W. Let P = (X ′1 ∩ V (G), . . . , X ′n ∩ V (G)) be the underlying partition for G that
one can deduce from P ′. By the hypothesis, there exists a k-deviation S that breaks P . However,
we can mimic this deviation in P ′, which is a contradiction because P ′ is k-stable. Consequently,
there does not exist any k-stable partition for G˜t. 
It is useful to notice that Lemma 17 still holds if we allow to add n′ ≥ n cliques Kit in graph
G˜t.
Another way to increase the minimum utility of the nodes is to substitute every vertex in the
graph by cliques. By this second process, we get the graph G¯α. Formally:
Definition 10 Let W be any set of weights such that W+ 6= ∅. Given a graph G = (V,w) and
a positive integer α, for every vertex u ∈ V we can define the clique graph Ku = (Vu, wu) with α
nodes and the set of weights {wp}. The graph G¯α = (V¯ , w¯) is then built as follows:
• V¯ = ⋃u∈V Vu;
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Figure 7: The transformation of an input.
• for every u ∈ V , for all u1, u2 ∈ Vu, w¯u1u2 = wp;
• for all u, v ∈ V , for all ui ∈ Vu and for all vj ∈ Vv, w¯uivj = wuv.
We are now able to prove Theorem 6:
Proof. [Theorem 6] Suppose there exists a graph G0 = (V0, w
0) with W such that there does
not exist any k-stable partition for G0. We get there are positive weights, because otherwise the
partition with only singleton groups is k-stable for G0. Moreover, we can assume that there exists a
node x0 ∈ V0 such that the removal of x0 makes the existence of a k-stable partition for the gotten
subgraph. Indeed, otherwise, we remove nodes sequentially until obtaining this property.
Let us choose P 0 a k-stable partition for G0 \ x0. By the hypothesis, the partition P 0 ∪ {x0}
is not k-stable for G0. Let us define f0 as the maximum utility the vertex x0 can get with only
one k-deviation that breaks P 0 ∪ {x0}. Note that we can always assume f0 > 0 by using the
transformation of Definition 9 if needed. We define two other constants, namely α = d f0wp e and
c0 = 2n0 + 1, with n0 = |V0|.
We can now prove the NP-hardness by using a polynomial reduction for the Maximum Inde-
pendent Set problem. Let G = (V,E) be a graph, and let c ≥ c0 be an integer. We identify G
to the conflict graph of some network DG with the set of weights {−∞, wp}. Let t be the integer
bαc − f0wp c. We can consider the graphs G1 = G˜0t = (V1, w1) and G2 = G¯α = (V2, w2). Observe
that t > αc − f0wp − 1 ≥ αc − n0 − 1 ≥ c − n0 − 1 ≥ n0, because f0 ≤ n0wp. So we can apply
Lemma 17 to G1.
We build the graph HG = (VH , w
H) as follows:
• VH = V1 ∪ V2;
• for all i ∈ {1, 2}, for all ui, vi ∈ Vi, wHuivi = wiuivi ;
• for all u1 ∈ V1, for all v2 ∈ V2, wHu1v2 = wp if u1 = x0, and wHu1v2 = −∞ otherwise.
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The transformation above is illustrated in Figure 7. First assume that any independent set of G
has a size lower than c. Then, there can be no group in a stable partition with more than α(c− 1)
vertices of V2. Furthermore, α(c− 1) = αc− d f0wp e ≤ αc−
f0
wp
− 1 < t, and so, the minimum utility
reachable by x0 in G1 is greater than its maximum utility in G2. As a consequence, P0 can be
partitioned into a 1-stable partition for G1 and a 1-stable partition for G2. Moreover, there is no
k-stable partition for G0 by the hypothesis, hence there is no k-stable partition for G1 either by
Lemma 17. Therefore, there is no k-stable partition for HG.
Conversely, assume that there exists an independent set of G with size at least c. By [26], there
exists a k-stable partition Pα for G2 ∪ {x0} such that there is a group X ∈ Pα that is a maximum
independent set of the conflict graph of G2∪{x0}. Furthermore, x0 ∈ X, because x0 has no conflict
within the graph. We can also observe that G1 \ x0 is ˜(G0 \ x0)t with an extra clique graph Kn0t
added. Hence, both these graphs have the same stable properties, that is if P 0 = (X1, . . . , Xn0−1)
is a k-stable partition for G0 \ x0, then we can associate to it a k-stable partition P t1 for G1 \ x0,
by Lemma 17. We then claim that PH = Pα ∪ P t1 is a k-stable partition for HG. Indeed, we have
that the utility of x0 in P
α is at least wpαc. Moreover, the maximum utility x0 can get after a
k-deviation that breaks P t1 is f0 + wpt = wp(t+
f0
wp
) ≤ wpαc.
We can conclude the NP-hardness, as our transformation is polynomial, and the Maximum
Independent Set problem is NP-complete [24]. 
7.5 Appendix 3: Extensions of coloring games
7.5.1 Asymmetry and Gossiping
Proof. [Theorem 8] We use in our reduction the multi-way partitioning number problem, which is
NP-complete [27]. Furthermore, we constrain ourselves to g = 2 in order to ease the proof. This
is enough so that we give the intuition of the general case. Note that the multi-way partitioning
number is also known as the Partition problem when g = 2. So, in order to prevent any confusion,
we will use the word ’partition’ only for the Partition problem, that is we call the partitions of the
nodes ’configurations’ in the sequel.
Consider an instance S of Partition problem. Let us call T =
∑
s∈S s. We define D as follows.
The set of vertices is V = S ∪ {z, u, v}. For all s1, s2 ∈ S, with s1 6= s2, we set ws1s2 = −s2,
ws1u = ws1v = T − s1 + 1, wus1 = wvs1 = 0, and finally, ws1z = −wzs1 = s1. We also set
wuv = wvu = −∞, that wuz = wvz = 0, and that wzu = wzv = T + 1. Such a digraph D can be
built in polynomial time.
First, in any stable configuration for D, we get that u and v must be in two different groups
because they are mutual enemies. Furthermore, for all vertex x /∈ {u, v}, wux = wvx = 0 and so, the
other vertices do not matter for u and v. Hence for any configuration P such that X(u) 6= X(v),
and for any k, there is no subset that contains u or v and that may break the configuration.
Moreover, we recall that wzs < 0 for any s ∈ S. Consequently, in any configuration P for D
such that X(z) 6= X(u) and X(z) 6= X(v), we get that fz(P ) ≤ 0, whereas in any configuration
P ′ such that X(z) = X(u) or X(z) = X(v), we get that fz(P ′) ≥ 1 because
∑
s∈S wzs = −T and
wzu = wzv = T + 1.
Hence, for any stable configuration for D, we conclude that either z is in the same group X0 as
u, or z is in the same group X1 as v. Without any loss of generality, suppose z in the same group
X0 as u. We claim that any vertex s in S must be also in the same group X0 as u and z or in
the same group X1 as v. Indeed, otherwise we would have that fs(P ) ≤ 0, since wss′ ≤ 0 for any
s′ ∈ S; however such a configuration P is not 1-stable, because if vertex s joins the group X1, then
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fs(P
′) > 0, with P ′ being the new configuration, due to the fact that wsv = T − s + 1 > 0, and
T − s = −[∑s′∈S wss′ ]. Thus, there can be only two groups in a stable configuration of D.
Let P = (X0, X1) be a configuration forD such thatX(u) 6= X(v) and Si = {si ∈ S|si ∈ Xi}, i ∈
{0, 1}. We can assume that S0, S1 is a partition of S. Let us call Ti =
∑
si∈Si si. By definition
of w, for any i ∈ {0, 1}, for all vertex si of Si, we get that fsi(P ) = T + 1 −
∑
s′i∈Si s
′
i + csi =
T − Ti + 1 + csi = T1−i + 1 + csi , where the value of csi ∈ {0, si} depends on whether z is in Xi. In
the same way, one can prove that if z is in Xj for some j ∈ {0, 1} then fz(P ) = T1−j + 1.
It is important to notice that there is no subset of V that breaks the configuration P in creating
a new group. Indeed, u and v cannot be part of such a subset, and it cannot contain z either,
because z must be in the group of u or in the group of v. Furthermore, in any subset of S that is
taken as a new group, all of the individual utilities are non positive, whereas they were positive in
the original groups.
Let s ∈ S be a vertex of Xi for some i, such that Ti ≤ T1−i. We get that fs(P ) ≥ T1−i + 1.
Consequently, s has no incentive in moving intoX1−i, whatever it is a collective move or not, because
in such a new configuration P ′ we get fs(P ′) ≤ T ′i + s+ 1 ≤ (Ti − s) + s+ 1 = Ti + 1 ≤ T1−i + 1.
We prove in a similar way that vertex z has no incentive in leaving the group Xi when Ti ≤ T1−i.
Therefore if S0, S1 is a solution for the Partition problem, then T0 = T1, that is Ti ≤ T1−i for all
i ∈ {0, 1} and so, for every k ≥ 1 we get that P is a k-stable configuration for D.
Conversely, let us suppose that S0, S1 is not a solution for the Partition problem, that is Ti <
T1−i for some i, and let us show that P is not a 1-stable configuration for D. Obviously, z moves into
Xi provided z belongs to X1−i. So we now assume that z is in Xi. Then, any singleton {s1−i} with
s1−i ∈ S1−i breaks the configuration, because in the new configuration P ′ where vertex s1−i has
moved into group Xi we get that fs1−i(P
′) = T1−i+1, that is strictly greater than fs1−i(P ) = Ti+1.
Finally, for any k ≥ 1, there is a k-stable configuration P for the digraph D if and only if there
is a solution to the Partition problem for the set S. 
Proof. [Theorem 7] For our reduction, we use 3-coloring problem, that consists in determining
whether there exists a proper 3-coloring of a given graph G = (V,E), a well known NP-complete
problem [16]. Let G be an instance for the 3-coloring problem. We define the graph Gc = (V,w)
as follows. For any vertex v of G there are five vertices v1, v2, vc1 , vc2 , vc3 in V . We say that vci is a
colored vertex, and that it has the color i. There are also three special vertices in V , namely c1, c2
and c3.
For any vertex v of G we set wv1v2 = 1, wv1vc1 = wv1vc2 = wv1vc3 = 1, wv2vc1 = wv2vc2 = wv2vc3 =
1, and wvc1vc2 = wvc1vc3 = wvc2vc3 = −∞. For any vertices u, v in G, and for any i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3},
i 6= j, we also set wcivci = wciuci = 1, wcicj = −∞, and wucicj = wucivcj = −∞. In the case when u
and v are adjacent in G, we set the weights wviuj = −∞, for any i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Finally, every other
weight equals 0.
We have that, for any i, and for any vertex v of G, vci and ci gossip when they are not in
the same group, because wvcici = 1 and their enemies are the same. Furthermore, vertices v1 and
v2 gossip when they are not in the same group too. We now suppose there exists a gossip-stable
partition P such that none of the vertices vci , for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, is in the same group as v1 and v2,
and we claim that there is a contradiction. Indeed, all the colored vertices that are in the same
group as v1 and v2, if any, have the same color i, because otherwise there would be enemies in the
group and P would not be stable. Thus, there is at least one vertex vci that breaks the partition
by joining the group of v1 and v2, because wvciv1 +wvciv2 = 2 whereas wvcici = 1. A contradiction.
Finally, there can be only three groups in any gossip-stable partition for Gc. Moreover, we claim
those three groups are equivalent to a proper 3-coloring of G. Indeed, suppose P is a gossip-stable
partition for Gc, with only three groups. We have that X(c1), X(c2), X(c3) are pairwise different,
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because these three nodes are enemies. Thus we can define a 3-coloring of G in the following way:
for every vertex v of G, c(v) = i if and only if X(v1) (= X(v2)) = X(ci), with 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. This
3-coloring is proper, because otherwise there would be enemies in at least one group in P .
Conversely, suppose that we have a proper 3-coloring c of G. We define the partition P =
(X1, X2, X3) as follows. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, ci ∈ Xi, and any colored vertex vci is in Xi too.
Furthermore, for all vertex v of G, we have that v1, v2 ∈ Xc(v). By construction, there is no
enemies in any of these three groups. Moreover, we claim that there is no gossiping between any
two vertices that are in different groups. Indeed, there can only be gossiping between two vertices
vj and vci , with j ∈ {1, 2}, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and vj /∈ Xi; however, the very definition of the partition
P implies that vci has, at least, one enemy in the group of vj , namely c(v), and so, there is no
gossiping at all. To conclude, we claim that any subset S, |S| ≤ 2, does not break P . Indeed,
the vertices in S can only found a new group in P , by the very definition of the weights w in Gc.
Furthermore, for all vertex u ∈ Gc, we have that fu(P ) ≥ 1. Hence, there is no vertex in Gc that
can strictly increase its utility by a 2-deviation, and so, P is a 2-stable, gossip stable partition. 
7.5.2 Multichannels
Proof. [Lemma 4] We use the counter-example Gq=1 = (Vq=1, w
q=1) of Lemma 3 for the proof. Note
that, for each node u ∈ Vq=1, there exists at most one node v ∈ Vq=1 such that wq=1uv = 0.
In the sequel, K denotes a clique of order p > 2|Vq=1| with weight 1. We now assume that
ε < 1/p for the rest of the proof, and we construct the graph Gq=2 = (Vq=2, w
q=2) as follows. We
first start from Gq=1. For any node u ∈ Vq=1 such that wq=1uv 6= 0 for any v ∈ Vq=1, we add a copy
of K, denoted Ku = (Vu, Eu). We set w
q=2
ux = 1 for any x ∈ Vu. For any edge uv with wq=1uv = 0,
we add another copy of K, denoted K(u,v) = (V(u,v), E(u,v)). We set w
q=2
ux = w
q=2
vx = 1 for any
x ∈ V(u,v). Furthermore, we set wq=2uv = 1. Finally, the conflict graph consists of all the remaining
edges.
First, we get that for any u, v ∈ Vq=1 such that wq=1uv = 0, for any x, y ∈ V(u,v), |X(x) ∩X(y)| = 2
in any 3-stable configuration C with 2 channels for Gq=2.
Indeed, we have that any x ∈ V(u,v) cannot be in a group containing any node y ∈ Vq=2\(V(u,v)∪
{u, v}).
We first prove that in any 3-stable configuration C with 2 channels for Gq=2, we have |X(x) ∩
X(y)| 6= 1, for any x, y ∈ V(u,v). By contradiction. Assume there exist x, y ∈ V(u,v) such that
|X(x) ∩X(y)| = 1. Without loss of generality, assume that fx(C) ≥ fy(C). Then, there exists a
1-deviation: y reaches the group Xi such that x ∈ Xi and y /∈ Xi. In that case, fy(C ′) > fy(C),
where C ′ is the configuration for Gq=2 after the previous 1-deviation. Indeed, fy(C ′) = fx(C) + .
Thus, we assume that, in any 3-stable configuration C with 2 channels for Gq=2, we have
|X(x) ∩ X(y)| 6= 1, for any x, y ∈ V(u,v). Furthermore, if there exist x, y ∈ V(u,v) such that
|X(x) ∩ X(y)| = 0, then there exist two groups Xi and Xj such that x ∈ Xi, x ∈ Xj , and
Xi = Xj , and there exist two groups Xi′ and Xj′ such that y ∈ Xi′ , y ∈ Xj′ , and Xi′ = Xj′ .
Thus, fx(C) = (1 + )(|Xi| − 1), and fy(C) = (1 + )(|Xi′ | − 1). Without loss of generality,
suppose fx(C) ≥ fy(C). Then, there exists a 1-deviation: y leaves Xi′ and reaches Xi. We get
fy(C
′) = |Xi| + |Xi′ | − 1 > fy(C) because  < 1p . Thus, in any 3-stable configuration C with 2
channels for Gq=2, we have for any x, y ∈ V(u,v), |X(x) ∩X(y)| = 2, and so, the claim is proved.
Then, by the choice of 0 < ε < 1/p with p > 2|Vq=1|, there exist two groups Xi and Xj such that
Xi = V(u,v) and Xj = V(u,v) ∪{u, v}. Indeed, otherwise there exists a 1-deviation for C, because by
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construction |V(u,v)| > fu(C ′), with C ′ being any configuration with 2 channels for Gq=1. We obtain
the same result for copies Ku. To summarize, after setting the groups from the previously necessary
conditions for having a 3-stable configuration with 2 channels for Gq=1, each node u ∈ V \ Vq=1
belongs to exactly 2 groups, and each node u ∈ Vq=1 belongs to exactly 1 group.
Thus, there exists a 3-stable configuration for Gq=2 with 2 channels if, and only if, there exists
a 3-stable configuration for Gq=1 with single channel. Indeed, any two nodes u, v ∈ Vq=1 such
that wq=1uv = 0, are already in a same group. Thus, by the choice of the function h, this mimics
a weight ε between these two nodes for determining the other groups, that is quite the same as a
weight 0, because ε is arbitrarily small (see Corollary 3). Finally, there does not exists a 3-stable
configuration for Gq=2 with 2 channels because there does not exist a 3-stable configuration for
Gq=1 with single channel by Lemma 3. 
Proof. [Theorem 9]
Claim 17 There exists a graph G = (V,w) with W = {−∞,−4, 2, 6, 7}.such that any partition of
the nodes for G is not 2-stable.
Proof. Let G1 = (V,w) be the graph built as follows. Let V = {u1, u2, u3, u4}. We set wu1u2 =
wu1u3 = −∞, wu1u4 = 7, wu2u4 = 6, wu3u4 = 2, and wu2u3 = −4.
For any k ≥ 1, any k-stable partition P for G1 is such that fu(P ) ≥ 0 for any u ∈ V . Thus, for
any k ≥ 1, the following partitions for G1 are not k-stable:
• P = ({u1}, {u2, u3, u4}) as fu3(P ) = −2 < 0;
• P = ({u1}, {u2, u3}, {u4}) as fu3(P ) = −4 < 0;
• P = ({u1, u4}, {u2, u3}) as fu3(P ) = −4 < 0;
• any partition P = (X1, X2, X3, X4) (Xi may be empty for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4) such that
u1, u2 ∈ Xi and/or u1, u3 ∈ Xi for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4.
Thus, it remains to prove the result for the other partitions for G1.
• Consider the partition P = ({u1}, {u2}, {u3}, {u4}) for G1. P is not 1-stable because u4 can
reach group {u1}. Indeed, fu4(P ′) = fu4(P ) + 7 = 7 where P ′ = ({u1, u4}, {u2}, {u3}) is the
resulting partition after this 1-deviation.
• Consider the partition P = ({u1, u4}, {u2}, {u3}) for G1. P is not 2-stable because u2 and
u4 can reach group {u3}. Indeed, fu2(P ′) = fu2(P ) + 6− 4 = fu2(P ) + 2 = 2 and fu4(P ′) =
fu4(P )− 7 + 6 + 2 = fu4(P ) + 1 = 8 where P ′ = ({u1}, {u2, u3, u4}) is the resulting partition
for G1 after this 2-deviation.
• Consider the partition P = ({u1}, {u2, u4}, {u3}) for G1. P is not 1-stable because u4
can reach group {u1}. Indeed, fu4(P ′) = fu4(P ) − 6 + 7 = fu4(P ) + 1 = 7 where P ′ =
({u1, u4}, {u2}, {u3}) is the resulting partition for G1 after this 1-deviation.
• Consider the partition P = ({u1}, {u2}, {u3, u4}) for G1. P is not 1-stable because u4
can reach group {u1}. Indeed, fu4(P ′) = fu4(P ) − 2 + 7 = fu4(P ) + 5 = 7 where P ′ =
({u1, u4}, {u2}, {u3}) is the resulting partition for G1 after this 1-deviation.
Finally, any partition P for G1 is not a 2-stable partition for G1. 
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Claim 18 Let us fix h is as h(0, w) = 0, h(g + 1, w) = (1 + εg)w, where ε > 0 is arbitrarily
small. Given any integer q ≥ 1, there exists a graph Gq = (Vq, wq) with W = {−∞,−4, 2, 6, 7, N}
such that any configuration C with q channels for Gq is not 2-stable, whereas there always exists a
2-stable configuration C ′ with q′ 6= q channels for Gq.
Proof. We arbitrarily select  < 1/N . Let G1 = (V1, w
1) be the graph that is presented in the proof
of Claim 17 (we re-use the same notations for the vertices in G1). We build the graph Gq as follows.
First, the set of vertices is Vq = V1 ∪ {x1, . . . , xq−1}. For any u, v ∈ V1, wquv = w1uv. Furthermore,
for any 1 ≤ i < j ≤ q − 1, wqxiu4 = wqxju4 = N , wqxixj = wqxiv = wqxjv = −∞ for any v ∈ V1 \ {u4}.
We have that, for any q′ < q, the following configuration is 2-stable with q′ channels in the
graph Gq:
Cq′ = ({u4, x1}, . . . , {u4, xq′}, {u1}1, . . . , {u1}q′ , {u2}1, . . . , {u2}q′ , {u3}1, . . . , {u3}q′ ,
{x1}1, . . . , {x1}q′−1, . . . , {xq′}1, . . . , {xq′}q′−1,
{xq′+1}1, . . . , {xq′+1}q′ , . . . , {xq−1}1, . . . , {xq−1}q′) .
However, in any stable configuration Cq with q channels for Gq, we necessarily have {u4, xi} as
a group in Cq (without repetitions), for any 1 ≤ i ≤ q − 1. As there does not exist any 2-stable
configuration with single channel for G1, there does not exist any 2-stable configuration with q
channels for Gq.
If q′ = q + 1, then the following configuration is 2-stable with q′ channels for the graph Gq:
Cq′ = ({u4, x1}, . . . , {u4, xq−1}, {u4, u1}, {u4, u2}, {u1}1, . . . , {u1}q′−1, {u2}1, . . . , {u2}q′−1,
{u3}1, . . . , {u3}q′ , {x1}1, . . . , {x1}q′−1, . . . , {xq−1}1, . . . , {xq−1}q′−1) .
Finally, if q′ ≥ q + 2, then the following configuration is 2-stable with q′ channels in Gq:
Cq′ = ({u4, x1}1, . . . , {u4, x1}q′−q−1,
{u4, x2}, . . . , {u4, xq−1}, {u4, u1}, {u4, u2}, {u4, u3}, {u1}1, . . . ,
{u1}q′−1, {u2}1, . . . , {u2}q′−1, {u3}1, . . . , {u3}q′−1, {x1}1, . . . ,
{x1}q+1, {x2}1, . . . , {x2}q′−1, . . . , {xq−1}1, . . . , {xq−1}q′−1) . 
For any 1 ≤ t ≤ l, let Gqit be the graph in the proof of Claim 18 such that there exists a 2-stable
configuration with q′ channels for Gqit if, and only if, q
′ 6= qit . By convention, G0 is any graph such
that there always is a 2-stable configuration with q channels for G0; for instance, we may assume
that all the weights for G0 are positive.
Then we build a graph G from G0, Gqi1 , . . . Gqil , such that any vertices u, v that are not in the
same graph Gq are enemies (e.g. wuv = −∞). By doing so, every graph Gq is independent of the
other ones, and so, there is a 2-stable configuration with q′ channels for G if, and only if, there
exists a 2-stable configuration with q′ channels for every Gqit , 1 ≤ t ≤ l. 
7.5.3 Multi-modal relationship
Our model so far is heavily biased towards pairwise relationship, as the utility of a player depends on
the sum of her interaction with all other members of the groups. In reality, more subtle interaction
occur: one may be interested to interact with either friend u or v, but would not like to join a
group where both of them are present.
Our analysis also generalize to this case. We define a coloring game over a weighted undirected
hypergraph H = (V,w), with w a weight function from Pt(V ) to N, where Pt(V ) denotes the
subsets in V of size at most t. Note that t = ∞ is allowed by our model. The utility of a node u
in partition P now equals:
∑
{u}⊆A⊆X(u),|A|≤twA.
We prove in Lemma 18 that 1-stability is guaranteed. Interestingly, the proof uses a different
potential function than the global utility: φ(P ) =
∑n
i=1
∑
A⊆Xi,|A|≤twA.
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Lemma 18 For every hypergraph H = (V,w), there exists a 1-stable partition.
Proof. [Lemma 18] Let P be a partition of the nodes for H, let u be a vertex that breaks P and
let P ′ be the resulting partition. We use the potential function φ(P ) =
∑n
i=1
∑
A⊆Xi,|A|≤tw(A) for
the proof. Observe that φ(P ′)− φ(P ) = fu(P ′)− fu(P ) > 0. As φ is upper-bounded, the dynamic
of the coloring game always converges. 
Moreover, all results on uniform games hold. Formally, for any group Xj ∈ P , the vertices u in
Xj have a utility
∑
{u}⊂A⊆Xj ,|S|≤twA =
∑t−1
i=1
(|Xj |−1
i
)
, which is monotically increasing in the size
of their group.
Given a general hypergraph H = (V,w), we define the friendship hypergraph H+ in the
same way as the friendship graph defined in Section 4.1. A Berge cycle in H+ is a sequence
v0, e0, v1, . . . , vp−1, ep−1, v0, such that:
• v0, v1, . . . , vp−1 are pairwise different vertices;
• e0, e1, . . . , ep−1 are pairwise different hyperedges;
• for all 0 ≤ i ≤ p− 1, vi, vi+1 ∈ Ei.
If subsets of nodes have weights in W = {−∞, 0, 1}, there still exists a k-stable partition for a
hypergraph H if the girth of the friendship hypergraph H+ is at least k+ 1. Note that it does not
imply 2-stability in general because the girth of a hypergraph may be 2.
Lemma 19 Let H = (V,E) be an acyclic hypergraph, with c connected components. Then |V | =∑
e∈E(|e| − 1) + c.
Proof. [Lemma 19] First we arbitrarily order the vertices in V , denoted v0, v1, . . . , vn−1. We build an
intersection graph G = (VH , EH) as follows. VH = {s0, s1, . . . , sn−1}, such that for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n−1,
si = {e ∈ E : {v0, . . . , vi} ∩ e = {vi}}. Moreover, for all 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n− 1, the edge sisj = sjsi is
in EH if and only if there is e ∈ si such that vj ∈ e. Observe that such a hyperedge e is necessarily
unique because H is acylic. Let us call it ei,j = ej,i. Thus, we get |EH | =
∑
e∈E(|e|−1). Moreover,
we claim that GH has the same number of connected components as H. Indeed, if si and sj are
adjacent in GH then vi and vj both belong to ei,j in H by definition of GH . Conversely, suppose
that vi and vj are adjacent in H. Let e be a hyperedge such that vi, vj ∈ e. By definition of GH ,
there exists 0 ≤ i0 ≤ min(i, j) such that e ∈ si0 . Furthermore, si0 is adjacent to both si and sj .
As a consequence, we get there are c connected components in GH . Finally, we claim that GH is
acyclic, because any cycle in GH would give a Berge cycle in H. Therefore, we have |VH | = |EH |+c.

Corollary 4 Given an integer k ≥ 1 and a hypergraph H = (V,w) with W = {−∞, 0, 1}, there is
a k-stable partition for H if the girth of the friendship hypergraph H+ is at least k + 1.
We will omit the proof as it is quite the same as for Theorem 13. In particular, there always
exists a 2-stable partition if the friendship hypergraph is simple, that is the intersection of two
different hyperedges has size at most 1.
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7.6 Appendix 4: Efficiency Stability Trade-off
Proof. [Lemma 5] Let us constrain ourselves to the set of weights {−∞, 1}. We consider a conflict
graph G− = (V,E). Given a partition P = {X1, . . . , Xn} for G−, the trick is to consider φ(P ) =∑n
i=1 |Xi|2 rather than f(P ); note that φ(P ) = f(P ) + n in this case. Also, we will denote by
OPT (G−) the optimal value taken by φ for any maximum partition of the nodes for G−; we will
denote by MIS(G−) the size of any maximum independent set of G−. Observe that such an
independent set represents a clique of friends in the coloring game.
By contradiction, suppose there exists a polynomial-time algorithm A, such that for any conflict
graph G− we have φ(A(G−)) ≥ n−1OPT (G−). We claim we can use algorithm A to compute an
independent set of G−. To do this, it suffices to take the largest group in A(G−). Moreover, we
know by [24], the Maximum Independent Set problem cannot be approximated within any
n

2
−1-ratio in polynomial time, unless P=NP. Then, if P 6= NP, there are graphs G− such that
the largest group in A(G−) has size lesser than n 2−1MIS(G−). Especially, for such a graph G−,
we have φ(A(G−)) < n.(n 2−1MIS(G−))2 = n−1(MIS(G−))2. However, we can always define a
partition of the nodes using a maximum independent set of G−; the remaining vertices, if any, are
supposed to be placed in singleton groups. Moreover, for the partition PMIS that we get for G
− we
have φ(PMIS) = (MIS(G
−))2. So, we have φ(A(G−)) < n−1OPT (G−), which is a contradiction
unless P = NP. 
Transformation for the proof of Theorem 10. We formally define the transformation as
follows:
Definition 11 For any graph G = (V,w) with W ⊆ {−∞} ∪ N, let G′ = (V ′, w′) be as follows.
a) For any u ∈ V , we have q nodes u1, u2, . . . , uq ∈ V ′ and we set w′uiuj = −∞ for any i, j,
1 ≤ i < j ≤ q;
b) For any u, v ∈ V such that wuv ∈ {−∞, 0}, we set w′uivj = wuv for any i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ q;
c) For any u, v ∈ V such that wuv > 0, for any g, 1 ≤ g ≤ q, we have two nodes uvg,1, uvg,2 ∈ V ′,
as shown in Figure 8, such that for any i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ q:
• w′uiuvg,1 = w′viuvg,1 = (h(g, wuv)− h(g − 1, wuv))/2;
• w′uivj = 0;
• w′uvg,1uvg,2 = 3(h(g, wuv)− h(g − 1, wuv))/4;
• w′uvg,2y = −∞, ∀y /∈ {uvg,1, uvg,2};
• w′uvg,1uvg′,1 = −∞, ∀g′ 6= g, 1 ≤ g′ ≤ q;
• w′uvg,1y = 0,∀y /∈{ui, vi, uvg′,1, uvg,2, 1≤ i, g′≤ q}.
Let P ′ be a maximum partition of the nodes for G′. Note that X(ui) 6= X(uj) for any i 6= j,
and X(ui) = X(vj) if, and only if, a unique uvg,1 exists such that X(ui) = X(uvg,1) = X(vj). From
P ′ we can then build a configuration C with q channels for G by replacing all nodes ui by u and
deleting all nodes uvg,1 and uvg,2. The proof concludes by proving that P
′ is not maximum if C
isn’t. Formally:
Proof. [Theorem 10] Let P ′ be any maximum partition for G′. We prove several properties for P ′.
a) For any u ∈ V , we have X(ui) 6= X(uj) for any i, j, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ q, because w′uiuj = −∞.
b) For any u, v ∈ V such that wuv = −∞, we have X(ui) 6= X(vj) for any i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ q,
because w′uivj = −∞.
c) For any u, v ∈ V such that wuv > 0, if there exist i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ q, such that X(ui) = X(vj),
then we claim there exists g, 1 ≤ g ≤ q, such that X(ui) = X(vj) = X(uvg,1). By contradiction.
If X(ui) = X(vj) and X(ui) = X(vj) 6= X(uvg,1) for any g, 1 ≤ g ≤ q, then we show there exists
a partition P ′′ for G′ such that f(P ′′) > f(P ′). Indeed, we proved before that X(ui′) 6= X(uj′)
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Figure 8: Representation in the graph G’ of an edge uv with positive weight in the transformation.
and X(vi′) 6= X(vj′) for any i′, j′, 1 ≤ i′ < j′ ≤ q. Thus, there exists g, 1 ≤ g ≤ q, such that
X(uvg,1) 6= X(ui′) and X(uvg,1) 6= X(vi′) for any i′, 1 ≤ i′ ≤ q. We get two cases:
1. if X(uvg,1) 6= X(y) for any y ∈ V ′, then we add uvg,1 in the group of ui and vj and we get
f(P ′′) = f(P ′) + 2(h(g, wuv)− h(g − 1, wuv)).
2. if X(uvg,1) = X(uvg,2), then X(uvg,1) 6= X(y) for any y ∈ V ′ by construction of G′. Thus, we
add uvg,1 in the group of ui and vj and we get f(P
′′) = f(P ′) + 2(h(g, wuv)−h(g−1, wuv))−
6(h(g, wuv)− h(g − 1, wuv))/4 > f(P ′).
d) For any u, v ∈ V such that wuv > 0, if there exist i, j, g, 1 ≤ i, j, g ≤ q, such that X(ui) =
X(vj) = X(uvg,1), then for any g
′ < g, we claim there exists i′, j′, 1 ≤ i′, j′ ≤ q, such that
X(ui′) = X(vj′) = X(uvg′,1). By contradiction. If there exists g
′ < g such that X(ui′) 6= X(uvg′,1)
or X(vj′) 6= X(uvg′,1) for any i′, j′, 1 ≤ i′, j′ ≤ q, then we again show there exists a partition P ′′
for G′ such that f(P ′′) ≥ f(P ′). Indeed, as h is concave, we have h(g′, wuv) − h(g′ − 1, wuv) ≥
h(g, wuv)− h(g − 1, wuv) because g′ < g. There are three cases.
1. Without loss of generality, if for some i′, 1 ≤ i′ ≤ q, X(ui′) = X(uvg′,1) and so, X(vj′) 6=
X(uvg′,1) for any j
′, 1 ≤ j′ ≤ q, then we add uvg′,1 to the group of ui and vj , and we
add uvg,1 to the group with uvg,2. We get the partition P
′′ such that f(P ′′) = f(P ′) −
(h(g′, wuv) − h(g′ − 1, wuv)) + 2(h(g′, wuv) − h(g′ − 1, wuv)) − 2(h(g, wuv) − h(g − 1, wuv)) +
6(h(g, wuv)− h(g − 1, wuv))/4 > f(P ′), because X(uvg′,1) 6= X(uvg′,2) and because h is such
that h(g′, wuv)− h(g′ − 1, wuv) ≥ h(g, wuv)− h(g − 1, wuv).
2. If X(ui′) 6= X(uvg′,1), X(vj′) 6= X(uvg′,1) for any i′, j′, 1 ≤ i′, j′ ≤ q, and X(uvg′,1) 6=
X(uvg′,2), then we add uvg′,1 to the group of ui and vj , and we add uvg,1 to the group with
uvg,2. We obtain the partition P
′′ such that f(P ′′) = f(P ′)− 2(h(g, wuv)− h(g − 1, wuv)) +
2(h(g′, wuv)− h(g′ − 1, wuv)) + 6(h(g, wuv)− h(g − 1, wuv))/4 > f(P ′) by the choice of h.
3. If X(ui′) 6= X(uvg′,1), X(vj′) 6= X(uvg′,1) for any i′, j′, 1 ≤ i′, j′ ≤ q, and X(uvg′,1) =
X(uvg′,2), then we add uvg′,1 to the group of ui and vj , and we add uvg,1 to the group with
uvg,2. We obtain the partition P
′′ such that f(P ′′) = f(P ′)− 2(h(g, wuv)− h(g − 1, wuv)) +
2(h(g′, wuv)− h(g′ − 1, wuv))− 6(h(g′, wuv)− h(g′ − 1, wuv))/4 + 6(h(g, wuv)
− h(g − 1, w − u, v))/4 > f(P ′) by the choice of h.
To summarize, any maximum partition P ′ for G′ is such that: for any u ∈ V , X(ui) 6= X(uj)
for any i 6= j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ q; for any u, v ∈ V such that wuv = −∞, X(ui) 6= X(vj) for any i, j,
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1 ≤ i, j ≤ q; for any u, v ∈ V such that wuv > 0, then there exists g, 0 ≤ g ≤ q, such that for
any g′ ≤ g, there exists i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ q, such that X(ui) = X(vj) = X(uvg′,1), and for all g′ > g,
X(uvg′,1) = X(uvg′,2) and so, X(uvg′,1) = {uvg′,1, uvg′,2}.
We get that any maximum partition P ′ for G′ is such that one can always write f(P ′) =
c+ f ′(P ′) where c is the constant
∑
u,v∈V,wuv>0
∑q
g=1 6(h(g, wuv)− h(g − 1, wuv))/4, and f ′(P ′) =∑
u,v∈V,wuv>0
∑q
g=1 I{∃i,j,X(ui)=X(uj)}(h(g, wuv)− h(g − 1, wuv))/2.
We now construct the corresponding configuration C with q channels for G. For any group
Xj ∈ P , we construct the group X ′j ∈ C as follows. For any u ∈ V , u ∈ X ′j if, and only if, there
exists i, 1 ≤ i ≤ q, such that ui ∈ Xj . Clearly, the construction of G′ and the construction of C
can be done in linear time in the size of G.
By construction, we get that f(C) = 4f ′(P ′).
We now prove that if P ′ is maximum for G′, then C is maximum for G. First suppose P ′ is
maximum for G′. By contradiction. Suppose there exists a configuration C ′ with q channels for G
such that f(C ′) > f(C). We prove that there exists a partition P ′′ for G′ such that f(P ′′) > f(P ′).
We construct P ′′ as follows. For any group Xiq ∈ C ′, we construct the group X ′iq for P ′′ as follows:
sequentially, for any u, v ∈ Xiq , there exist i, j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ q such that ui and uj are not yet in one
group in P ′′. If there exist, we choose ui and/or vj that are not yet in group X ′iq . Furthermore, if
wuv > 0, we choose the smallest g, 1 ≤ g ≤ q, such that uvg,1 is not yet in one group in P ′′. We
add ui, uj , and uvg,1 in group X
′
iq
.
We get that f(P ′′) = c+ f ′(P ′′) where f ′(P ′′) = f(C ′)/4 by construction.
Thus, we get f(P ′′) > f(P ′) because f ′(P ′′) > f ′(P ′). A contradiction because P ′ is maximum
for G′. Finally, C is maximum for G. 
Proof. [Theorem 11] We construct G = (V,w) as follows. Let G1 = (V1, w
1) be any graph such
that w1uv ∈ {−∞, 0} for any u, v ∈ V1. Let V = V1 ∪ {u, v1, v2, . . . , v|V1|}. We set wux = N for any
x ∈ V1. We set wuvi = 1 for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ |V1|. We set wvix = −∞ for any x ∈ V1 and for any i,
1 ≤ i ≤ |V1|.
Let U = 2|Vi|. If there exists a configuration C with q channels for G such that f(C) ≥ U ,
then we claim |X(u) ∩X(x)| ≥ 1 for any x ∈ V \ {u}. Indeed, there are exactly 2|Vi| edges with
weights 1. Thus, by construction of G, the problem remains to minimize the number of groups
containing node u. Clearly by construction, we have |Vi| groups of size 2 composed of {u, vi} for
any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ |Vi|. Then, u must be in one group with each x ∈ V1. As w1uv ∈ {−∞, 0} for any
u, v ∈ V1, then we have to partition the nodes V1 into groups without arcs with weight −∞, and we
have to minimize the number of groups. Said differently, the problem remains to find the chromatic
number of the conflict graph. As for all ε > 0, approximating the chromatic number within n1−ε
is NP-hard [32], then we get the result. 
Proof. [Lemma 6] a) Case {−∞, 0, b} ⊆ W.
Let n′ ≥ √R/2b be an integer. We now build G = (V,w) with V = V1 ∪ V2 ∪ {v1, v2}, such
that |V1| = |V2| = n′. For any u, v /∈ {v1, v2}, we set wuv = b if u and v are not in the same
subset Vi, and wuv = 0 otherwise. Moreover, v1 (v2, respectively) is enemy with any vertex of V2
(V1, respectively), and for any u ∈ V1, any v ∈ V2, we have wuv1 = wvv2 = wv1v2 = 0. Partition
P = (V1 ∪ {v1}, V2 ∪ {v2}) is 1-stable for G, and f(P ) = 0.10 Furthermore, a maximum partition
for G is P+ = (V1 ∪ V2, {v1, v2}) and f(P+) = 2bn′2 ≥ R.
b) Case {−a, b} ⊆ W.
10Note we can make q copies of each groups and then, the 1-stability also holds, for instance, if we choose
h(0, w) = 0, h(g + 1, w) = w for the proof.
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Let n′ ≥ R2b(b+a) be an integer. Let d = 2n′b, and n = 2n′(b+ a) + 1. First observe that n > d.
We claim that there exists a d-regular graph G with n vertices. Indeed, let us choose G such that
the vertices in G are labeled by the integers of Zn; for all i, j ∈ Zn, there is an edge ij in G if, and
only if, j ≡ i− d/2 + α (mod n), for every 0 ≤ α ≤ d such that α 6= d/2.
We now define the graph G′ = (V,w) as follows. The vertices in G′ are the vertices in G. For
all i, j ∈ Zn, i 6= j, wij = −a if ij is an edge of G, and wij = b otherwise.
We have that P = (V ) is a 1-stable partition for G′. Furthermore, for all i ∈ Zn, fi(P ) =
−da+ (n− d− 1)b = 0.
On the other hand, P ′ = ({0, 1}, {2, 3}, . . . , {n − 3, n − 2}, {n − 1}) is a partition for G′ such
that f(P ′) = b(n− 1) ≥ R. 
Proof. [Lemma 7] Let G = (V,w) be any graph, with m+ denoting the number of edges with positive
weights. We choose G as an input for the greedy algorithm. It takes s ≥ 0 steps for computing
a 1-stable configuration Cs with q channels for G. Note that f(Cs) ≥ s because the global utility
strictly increases at each step (Theorem 5).
Let us denote Vs the set of nodes u such that there is at least one of their q groups in Cs
that is not a singleton group. We prove that ns ≤ 2s, where ns = |Vs|. Indeed, at each step of
the algorithm, any vertex v has at most one of its singleton groups that has been modified into
another, larger group. Furthermore, any such step modifies the singleton groups of at most two
distinct vertices.
As a consequence, there are at most nns ≤ 2sn edges uv such that wuv > 0 and either u ∈ Vs
or v ∈ Vs. Moreover, note that there does not exist any couple of vertices u, v ∈ V \ Vs, such
that wuv > 0, because Cs is 1-stable. Hence, 2sn ≥ m+, and so f(C+)/f(Cs) ≤ 2h(q, wp)m+/s =
O(h(q, wp)n). 
Proof. [Lemma 8] Notations are the same as for the previous proof of Lemma 7. We set m+ =
m1,+ +m0,+, where m1,+ is the number of edges uv such that wuv > 0 and X(u) ∩X(v) 6= ∅, and
m0,+ is the number of edges u
′v′ such that wu′v′ > 0 whereas X(u′) ∩X(v′) = ∅, respectively. By
induction on the number of steps of the greedy algorithm, we get that for every two vertices u, v
such that wuv = −∞, X(u) ∩X(v) = ∅, because u would avoid at any cost to interact with v, and
reciprocally. As a consequence, we have f(Cs) ≥ max(s,m1,+). Furthermore, we denote Vq the set
of vertices such that none of their q groups in Cs is a singleton group, and we get |Vq| ≤ 2s/q. As
Cs is 1-stable by the hypothesis, there does not exist any couple of vertices u, v ∈ V \Vq, such that
wuv > 0 whereas X(u) ∩X(v) = ∅ and so, m0,+ ≤ 2sn/q ≤ 2nf(Cs)/q.
Finally, f(C
+)
f(Cs)
≤ 2h(q, wp) m+f(Cs) = 2h(q, wp)
m1,++m0,+
f(Cs)
≤ 2h(q, wp)(1 + 2nq ). 
Proof. [Theorem 12] Again, let m+ be the number of edges uv ∈ E such that wuv > 0. We have that
f(P+) ≤ 2m+wp. Moreover, for every edge uv of E such that wuv > 0, for any k-stable partition Pk
for G, we claim either fu(Pk) > 0 or fv(Pk) > 0. Indeed, suppose fu(Pk) = fv(Pk) = 0. Then {u, v}
breaks Pk by founding a new group, which is a contradiction. Thus, there are at least m+/∆+
vertices v of V such that fv(Pk) > 0, as the same node cannot be counted more than ∆+ times.
Consequently, f(P+)/f(P−k ) = O(∆+) = O(n). 
Proof. [Lemma 9] a) Case W ⊃ {−a, b}
Let n′ = (k + 1)2b n
(k+1)2
c ≤ n. We build G = (V,w) such that |V | = n′, as follows. The vertices in
V are labeled vi,j , with 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1, and with 1 ≤ j ≤ n′/(k + 1). For every 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1, the
row Li is the set {vi,1, vi,2, . . . , vi, n′
k+1
}. In the same way, for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n′k+1 , the column Cj is
the set {v1,j , . . . , vk+1,j}. Furthermore, vertices vi,j and vl,t are friends, that is wvi,jvl,t = b > 0, if,
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and only if, either i = l or j = t. Otherwise, wvi,jvl,t = −a ≤ 0.
Let us consider P = (L1, L2, . . . , Lk+1) for G. We have f(P ) = n
′b( n
′
k+1 − 1). On the other hand,
we present P ′ = (C1, C2, . . . , C n′
k+1
), and we claim that P ′ is a k-stable partition for G. Indeed,
observe that for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n′k+1 , any vertex vi,j ∈ Cj has one, and only one friend, in any other
column. Hence, if vi,j were part of a subset S that breaks P
′, then after the k-deviation, vi,j would
have, at most, k friends in its group, which is already the case in Cj . As a consequence, there is no
vertex that can strictly increase its utility by a k-deviation, and so, the claim is proved. However,
f(P ′) = n′bk. As a result, f(P
+)
f(P−k )
≥ f(P )f(P ′) =
n′
k+1
−1
k =
(k+1)b n
(k+1)2
c−1
k .
b) Case W ⊃ {b, b′}
This time, let n′ = kbb nkbc. We build G = (V,w) such that |V | = n′, as follows. The set of vertices
is partitioned into n
′
kb parts, denoted V1, V2, . . . , Vn′
kb
, of equal size kb. For every couple of vertices
u, v, wuv = b if u and v are in the same part Vi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ n′kb , and wuv = b′ otherwise.
Obviously, a maximum (stable) partition for G is P = (V ), and f(P ) = n′[b(kb−1)+b′(n′−kb)].
Furthermore, we claim that P ′ = (V1, V2, . . . , Vn′
kb
) is a k-stable partition too. Indeed, any vertex
v that might break P ′, by joining a coalition S whose size is greater or equal to k, would have its
individual utility after the deviation that is at most (k−1)b+kbb′ = kb(1+b′)−b ≤ kb2−b = (kb−1)b.
Hence P ′ is k-stable, and f(P ′) = n′b(kb− 1).
Finally, f(P )f(P ′) = 1 +
b′
b
n′−kb
kb−1 = 1 +
b′
b
kb(b n
kb
c−1)
kb−1 . 
47
